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T H E S E S

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Volume II



PACIFIC SCHOOL OF RELIGION

Berkeley, California







C O N T E N T S

FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

A Critical Survey of Plato's Science

Takeshi Shimizu

A Criticism of Certain Current Conceptions of  
The Idea of God

Bernard Darwin Treaster

Hebrew Wisdom Literature: Its Development and  
Significance

Mabel White

If Not Denominations -- ?

Raymond Edward Wilder

FOR THE DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF DIVINITY

The Origin and Early Development of the Eucharist

Arthur Francis Brett





A CRITICAL SURVEY OF PLATO'S SCIENCE  
OF a priori INTUITION AND REASONING FROM THE POINT  
OF VIEW OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

PART I

PLATO'S CONCEPTION OF MAN

T a k e s h i   S h i m i z u

Thesis

Submitted in the Department of Philosophy of Religion in  
partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts in the Pacific School of Religion

1 9 3 0



To

Professor John Wright Buckham,

Lover of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful,

This Work is Dedicated

in

Grateful Remembrance of My Student Life

in Berkeley





## P r e f a c e

### I

The present study is intended to be a criticism of Plato's philosophy of religion.<sup>1</sup> Within its scope the writer has originally attempted to deal with the three main lines, namely, Man, Ideas, and God. It is, however, impossible adequately to discuss all of them at one time: and after consideration, he has decided to take the first one in this thesis.

What is the proper method of dealing with this problem is one of the chief questions for the writer. If we intend to inquire into the thought of a philosopher we must first adopt the method of historical research; viz. (1) to make clear his relation with the previous thoughts, (2) to see the current thought of the age in which he lives, (3) to find what is his original thought. For further investigations, we must know the need of textual criticism; namely, we must collect the pieces of the writings and traditions which exist today, and discuss the authenticity and inner meaning of them, and finally reconstruct them in a system of thought under the guidance of our own judgment. This method of critical research is, however, not thoroughly applied to the present study, because of the writer's lack of the knowledge of Greek. It may be, he really wishes, completed in his further study of Plato in the near future. In the following pages, we shall briefly touch the problems of the Platonic writings, in which we shall simply indicate where

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1 By 'philosophy of religion' we mean a mode of thinking which takes religion as its object.





our problems of today lie.

## II

The Platonic dialogues are products of the refined intellectual society of Hellas: they are introduced to us in the form of "the embodiment of the mind of Socrates and of the reflection of Plato."

Plato's MSS. were not preserved in the library of his 'older academy.' The entire corpus of the Platonic writings, as a composite form, was compiled by Aristophanes<sup>1</sup> of Byzantium about two centuries before our Christian era; and this list was used by himself as the authorized edition, and has been partly preserved to the present. They are arranged in trilogies, though the list is not completed. Basing upon it, it is supposed, Dercylides and Thrasyllus<sup>2</sup> arranged thirty-six works of Plato in tetralogies, including the Epistles as one dialogue. Even in these days, there are some suggestive evidences of doubts regarding the authenticity and arrangement of Plato's MSS. The Hipparchus, Alcibiade II, and the Epinomis<sup>3</sup> have been hesitatingly ascribed to Plato. The Epinomis is, according to a sole statement of Diogenes Laertius, the work of Philip of Opus: Burnet agrees that the Epinomis is a later work than the Laws, that, from its striking title, it is an appendix to the

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1 He was the learned director of the Library of Alexandria. 2 These scholars' dates are uncertain; approximately, they lived in the first century B.C. or A.D. 3 The last one was ascribed traditionally to Phillinus (Philip) of Opus, who was a disciple of Plato and regarded as the editor of the Laws.



larger writing. And he proceeds further that " The speakers [however,] are the same as those in the Laws, and if we look at the linguistic peculiarities of the Epinomis, we see that they are practically identical with those of the Laws itself."<sup>1</sup> Besides these doubtful writings, the Theages, Minos, Clitophon were also condemned as un-Platonic; the critics also assumed an unfavorable attitude toward the Greater Hippias, Alcibiades I and Ion.<sup>2</sup>

To all students of Plato the name of Schleiermacher will be remembered for ever; he is the first who read the Platonic writings with the modern critical eye. His attempt<sup>2</sup> at criticism though he fell into the "ground-fallacy" of the hypothesis that the great Athenian philosopher intended in his early youth to build up a system of philosophy has been a permanent introduction of Plato to us. In this work he proposed to establish the order of the dialogues.<sup>3</sup> Since that time, attention has mainly concentrated upon the problem of the chronological order and authenticity of the dialogues. In the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century, Karl F. Hermann held the opinion that the dialogues were produced in accordance with the mental growth of Plato, and that they were faithfully reflected in it. But this is almost an impossible solution of

1 Burnet, Platonism, P.85 f. 2 Taylor, with H. Reader, insists that the Epinomis is genuine. Claiming that if the Epinomis and Epistles are denied, the important dialogues of Plato, in which his philosophy of arithmetic interwoven will be spurious, and our authoritative information about Plato's life will be false. Plato, P. 14 ff. 3 Introduction to the Dialogues of Plato, P. 9





the problem. E. Zeller at one time denied, though Aristotle guaranteed its authenticity, the genuineness of the Laws as a dialogue.<sup>1</sup> Ueberweg declared that the Parmenides, Sophistes and Politicus should be omitted from the dialogues.

In 1867 Lewis Campbell, who had been studying the vocabulary of the later dialogues, insisted that the Sophistes and Politicus, with the Philebus might be placed between the Republic and the Laws.<sup>2</sup> And some twenty years later, Dittenberger, Martin Schanz, each from a different angle, reached the same conclusion.<sup>3</sup> And Th. Gomperz, with W. Lutoslawski, affirmed this position. It is, however, still the object of controversy. In this respect A.E. Taylor is also favorable to the belief in the traditional authenticity of the dialogues, while Th. Gomperz is rather doubtful.<sup>4</sup>

Thus, the problem has been divergently discussed; but in recent times, these divergent views have been gradually approaching an agreement, and show a tendency which would help resolve the problem to some extent. By following the thread of the topics we may affirm, for instance, that the Sophistes and Politicus were linked with the Theaetetus; the Timaeus with the Republic. And by the consideration of the personages, particularly

<sup>1</sup> Zeller, Platonische Studien (1839), "Über den Ursprung der Schrift von den Gesetzen" and following chapters. Cf. his Plato and Older Academy, P. 549 f. <sup>2</sup> As to the order of the dialogues arranged by him, see the Appendix. <sup>3</sup> They devoted themselves chiefly to the study of adverbs and particles of the dialogues. <sup>4</sup> "One critic objected to work A because of its real or supposed discrepancy with B; another suspected B because of its real or supposed discrepancy with A." Greek Thinkers, ii, 277



the Socratic figure in the dialogues, we presume that the Sophistes, Politicus, Philebus,<sup>1</sup> Timaeus, Critias, and Laws should be arranged, as a group, in this order. As to the date of the composition of the Theaetetus, according to a historical investigation by Eva Sachs, and the textual criticism by Jowett, it has been affirmed and ascribed to 368-367 B.C. when Plato departed for Syracuse.<sup>2</sup> The Parmenides recently considered, from the point of view of its linguistic evidence, has been related to the Theaetetus. This, however, is hardly convincing because one critic investigates it from the standpoint of linguistics, while another from the development of its thought.<sup>3</sup> Taylor declares, from a criticism of the Platonic dramatization of the dialogues, that the Phaedo, Symposium, Protagoras and Republic belong to the earlier period as one group.<sup>4</sup> But the exact place of each of them remains uncertain. From the point of view of Platonic thought, the Theaetetus is an important dialogue, for with it we can divide the dialogues into two periods, the earlier and later ones although this division is not entirely satisfactory. The leading ideas in the Sophistes and Politicus are produced by an Eleatic, while in the Laws, this is done by an Athenian; and we naturally cannot avoid doubts regarding the words of the Socratic personage in the earlier dialogues. Here we need to discuss the meaning of the Socratic figures in the dialogues, associated with Plato.

The Philebus has been generally affirmed to be a dialogue later than the

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1 This dialogue may be an exception, for it dominantly contains the problems of ethics. 2 Jowett already suggested this date years before Sachs' affirmation of it. Cf. his Dial. of Plato, iv, 109-110. 3 Cf. Burnet, Platonism, 'Introductory.' 4 Plato (1929), p. 174 ff





Theaetetus; and it is universally recognized as such.<sup>1</sup> In this dialogue, Socrates is the chief person; and the ethical problems are exclusively put into the mouth of Socrates. As a solution of this problem, Taylor offers this explanation: Plato was "unwilling to make Socrates the exponent of doctrines which he knew to be his own property, though it is hard to understand his meanings if he had already for years been employing him in that very capacity."<sup>2</sup>

### III

We shall now touch the general problem of the relation between Socrates and Plato, partly dealt with in the previous section. Socrates left no written philosophical documents. We can hardly discover his philosophical principles. We might say that the philosophy of Plato is the completion and extension of that of Socrates; and that the Platonic problem and principle of philosophy are for the most part established upon a Socratic basis. It is, however, hard to determine how much Plato owes to Socrates.<sup>3</sup> In this respect, we need to study the chronological order of the dialogues, hoping that we shall find some clue which will lead us to a definite conclusion. The reason why Socrates is the chief

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<sup>1</sup> See Appendix. <sup>2</sup> "Plato" art. in EB<sup>14</sup>. We must also see that the Philebus has a more metaphysical turn than the earlier dialogues. See Lutoslawski, The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic, P. 195 f. <sup>3</sup> Cf. Burnet, Greek Philosophy (1914), Ch. ix, P. 151 ff. Burnet too much emphasizes on Plato's indebtedness to Socrates.



speaker in the earlier dialogues is that Plato was deeply impressed by the personality and scholarship of his teacher Socrates, and attempted to recall him to the mind of the age. Perhaps this assumption is not of much help in understanding the facts; for Plato was scarcely more than twenty, according to some Alexandrian biographers,<sup>1</sup> when he became a disciple of Socrates. The death of Socrates took place in the year of 399 B.C., when he was seventy or so, and Plato was, then, twenty-eight or nine.<sup>2</sup> We must remember also that the dialogues of Plato were composed during the fourth century B.C., and that Socrates died at the beginning of the century. Besides, the political and social conditions of Athens were much confused in these days. In addition to these considerations, Burnet points out that in the fifth century the Athenian empire was decadent, and the people who once contributed toward making Athens the center of intellectual life of Greece had almost disappeared; and that "many of the men who had gathered around Socrates in the days before the outbreak of the Poleponnesian War ( 431 B.C.) could no longer come to see him while the war lasted, though Plato makes a point of telling us in the Phaedo<sup>3</sup> that a number of them come to Athens to be with him when the war was over and before he put to death."<sup>4</sup> The Phaedo is, however,

<sup>1</sup> Taylor, Plato, P. 3 f.    <sup>2</sup> Ibid., Pp. 519-520    <sup>3</sup> Phaedo 59c: The pythagoreans from Thebes and the Eleatics from Megara came to meet the last hours of Socrates. Cf. Crito, 45b; Mem. iv. 8.4; Symp. 173d etc.  
<sup>4</sup> Platonism, p. 5



a dialogue in which Plato exhibits his dramatic genius, and we may naturally suppose that he was attempting to preserve, the great philosopher, Socrates' memory in a dramatic writing, because Plato was especially interested in the dramatic form at this period.<sup>1</sup> Also it may have seemed to him wisest to preserve the record of his master's life in that way since he was a victim of religious and political persecution.

The death of the great philosopher was an epoch in the life of Plato. He never achieved a political career in which he actually carried out his ideals, but devoted himself to the life of a philosopher. Throughout the writings of Plato, his own name is mentioned only three times, with the exception of the Epistles.<sup>2</sup>

Plato, as a dramatist, represents his master as a very distinguished personality; and as a philosopher, the head of the Academy; he is anxious to develop the work of Socrates and of the Pythagoreans. The role of the real Socrates is taken by the disguised Socrates in the later dialogues with an exception in the case of the Philebus, in which

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1 Cf. Symp., Protag., and Rep. 2 Apol. 34a: " . . And Adeimantus the son of Ariston, whose brother Plato is present; and Aeantodorus, who is the brother of Apollodorus, whom I ( Socrates ) also see." Ibid., 38b: "Also I ( Socrates ) have never been accustomed to think that I deserve to suffer any harm. Had I money I might have estimated the offence at what I was able to pay, and not have been much the worse. But I have none, and therefore I must ask you to proportion the fine to my means. Well, perhaps I could afford a mina, and therefore I propose that penalty: Plato, Crito, Critobus, and Apollodorus, my friends here, bid me say thirty minae, and they will be the sureties." Pheado, 59b: "Plato, if I ( Socrates ) am not mistaken, was ill." Here, the absence of Plato from the Socratic circle is simply mentioned.





Socrates, as mentined above, is the chief speaker. And in his last work, the Laws, Socrates entirely disappears.. In a word, we may say that Plato in his earlier dialogues intended to describe the philosophy and personality of his master, and while doing so gradually exposed his own views.

Here, we meet a difficult problem, viz., how can we distinguish the real Socrates from the Platonic Socrates, or Plato in the disguise of Socrates? It is almost impossible to disentangle them. We have no exact criterion which can be applied to the problem. It will be enough, for a preface of the present study, to mention what dialogues are to be considered as the Socratic Dialogues. We ascribe this title to the following dialogues:--

The Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, Ion, Menexenus, Charmenides, Laches, Lysis, Cratylus, Euthydemus, Gorgias, Meno, Euthyphro, Apology and Crito.<sup>1</sup>

In these dialogues we see certain characteristics which distinguish them from other Platonic works; as Aristotle suggests,<sup>2</sup> inductive reasoning is constantly applied to ethical problems in these brief dialogues. This method is generally attributed to Socrates. It is more Socratic than Platonic. Moreover, the traditional sixth tetralogy<sup>3</sup> in which Plato chiefly deals with the problem of virtue, belongs to an earlier group of his writings; hence, <sup>the</sup> argument is less political and more metaphysical. We also find the so-called Socratic confession of ignorance prominent in these shorter dialogues. Socrates offers no definite conclusion to the problem discussed though he constantly criticizes the doctrines of others. The 'Socratic

1 For further, see Taylor's Plato, Pp. 10-173    2 Metaph. 1078b 27

3 Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus and Gorgias.



irony' almost disappears in the Meno and a priori knowledge is introduced, --- a new light that discovers ethical truth, more exactly and more correctly than Socrates succeeded in doing.





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## I. I n t r o d u c t i o n

### Man As the Object of Self- knowledge

#### I

I must first know myself, as the Delphian inscription says; to be curious about that which is not my concern, while I am still in ignorance of myself, would be ridiculous.

Phaedr. 230a

#### S o c r a t e s

The second period of the history of Greek philosophy is called, "The age of the study of man." It begins with the Sophistic movement; Protagoras of Abdera. and Gorgias of Leontitnum are the greatest pair among philosophers in this movement.

The philosophy of Socrates is born out of the scepticism of the Sophists, especially of Protagoras.<sup>1</sup> In the scepticism of Protagoras we find two main elements, namely, Heraclitus' doctrine of flux and Democritus' sensualism. According to Democritus, the world of sense is deceptive; the senses do not reveal universals. Our only source of knowledge is sensation. It is not stable nor certain; and all our knowledge is uncertain. Thus, things that are given in sensation, are real existences for us. What a man experiences, or perceives and feels is truth for him. Sensations are, however, not the same for different individuals;

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1 Cf. Apelt, O., Platonische Aufsätze, P.iii; "Die Platonische Philosophie ist nicht fix und fertig aus dem Geiste ihres Schöpfers hervorgegangen, wie Minerva aus dem Hauptze Jupiter."



and the individuals has his own truth, i.e. the true to one is perhaps false to another. Each man has his particular criterion by which he recognizes only a particular truth, not the absolute truth. Both pure and practical truths are relative, and there is no permanent law or principle, for law is beyond our knowledge. For man, it is only possible to study himself by sense-perception, but the nature of ultimate moral truths may not be known. Philosophy is for Socrates and Plato the art of thinking, and of correct speaking, the problem of dialectics and rhetoric; and it is also the art of practical ethics, or seeking for happiness. Happiness means to be self-controlled, or to be virtuous.

The fruitage of the criticism of Protagoras is very great; his well-known maxim "man is the measure of all things" indicates a new direction of Greek philosophy.<sup>1</sup> For Socrates and Plato, it pointed the way forward. It denied the foundation of polytheism. It made clear the weakness of speculation and of naïve syllogism. Sophisticism, thus, destroyed the traditional methods and laws of philosophy; it became the so-called sophistic, in its later period; yet, it marks an epoch in the history of Greek philosophy: we may consider it as the dawning light of the science of logic, which afterward shone forth in the philosophy of Aristotle. It contributed also to the careful use of the form of the

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1 Pfeleiderer, E., Socrates u. Plato, P. 9: „Ihre klassische Formulierung endlich erhielt diese Seite des neuen Zeitgeists durch Protagoras von Abdera ( etwa 481-411 ). Mit Recht wird derselbe deshalb von Jeher als Vorfürer an die Spitze der ganzen Sophistik gestellt und lebt durch die Jahrhunderte fort mit seinem enigmatischen Wort : Aller Dinge Maß ( μέτρον ) ist der Mensch!“





science of thought, particularly the effective use of words as instruments in the search for truth.

Protagoras held the exclusively subjective criterion of truth. For him, there are as many truths as individuals. His failure is that he sees man, not as universal, but as merely particular, that is, the individual. The human understanding is not universal but particular, only. From contact with the sceptical criticism of Protagoras and the Sophists, the philosophy of Socrates emerges in an improved form.

## II

Γνῶθι σεαυτόν (Know thyself)--the words inscribed on the temple of Delphi, have still a living value and meaning for us. Socrates is a sceptic in the field of cosmology: he says that "all he knows is that he knows nothing." He believes, however, that there is something in our universe that may be known to us absolutely. We cannot know the exact nature of the physical world. It is man that man can know. And for Socrates, man becomes the only object of science,<sup>1</sup> more exactly, he can be dealt with in the realm of moral science;<sup>2</sup> and this, for him, is the main study. What ought we to be? what is the aim of life? --- these are the chief subjects of his philosophy. In his conception man chiefly means the soul,<sup>3</sup> where moral ideas are seated. The Socratic conception of man is not the particular, uncertain individual that Protagoras meant; but man in his universal aspect.

1 The term "science" used in this treatise, is equivalent with "scientific knowledge" or the "object of knowledge." 2 Cf. Charm. 164d-167e

3 Cf. Chap. II, sect. i, P.8



Thus, the chief concern of the philosophy of Socrates is to examine himself as the real object of moral science. 'The proper study of mankind is man.' The meaning and value of human life is the real knowledge for man. It is no longer subjective or particular knowledge. He attempts to inquire into objective moral ideas---absolute truth, goodness, justice, etc. Then truth is not convincing by different taste, but by a fundamental measure. The diversity of judgments and feelings of men is not the essential thing in the nature of man. That is a thing superficial and removal by an education that develops knowledge. He, thus, finds the one permanent man beneath the varieties of individual experience.

The foundation of his moral philosophy is that virtue is knowledge; and it is teachable to a certain extent. Thinking correctly and knowing correctly are the first step that leads us to absolute knowledge; and he loves the so-called dialectic method (διαλεκτική μέθοδος). His is never the question-and-answer formed in the mind of one philosopher alone, but in that of many. In this way he seeks to know truth; and to know himself is the beginning of all right knowledge.

### III

The starting point of the philosophy of Plato (as of his teacher Socrates), is knowledge of the good which constitutes virtue. It is intellectual.<sup>1</sup> In the light of general knowledge and self-knowledge, he develops the universal principle of morality. On this Socratic

1 Cf. Krohn, A., Die Platonische Frage, Kap. ii, "Die Ideenlehre u. die speculative Ethik" S. 53 ff "



foundation Plato builds up his theory of knowledge and contrasts the Protagorean relativism--- 'man is the measure of all things.' Plato attempts to discover universal knowledge, not limited to the individual nor to the moment. It is science; in other words, 'love of wisdom' (φιλοσοφία). He makes use of insight into the theory of knowledge. His purpose is not to form perception, nor opinion, but to gain true knowledge, which must be the cognition of the οὐσία or what is real. For him the οὐσία does not exist in the corporeal world.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, Plato insists, from the standpoint of Socrates, that real knowledge consists in general conceptions; that it really does exist, and the perception theory of Protagoras is a caricature of the theory of knowledge.

The issue between the two theories concerning knowledge we may find in certain passages of the Theaetetus.<sup>2</sup> In this dialogue, the relativism of Protagoras is chiefly dealt with. Socrates presents the question "What is knowledge?" to Theaetetus. Theaetetus replies with the Protagorean theory of knowledge, viz. it is perception. And he explains it with an illustration of the wind: Assuming that we are facing the same wind, one may feel it as hot while to another it is cold; because the former is cold, the latter hot. Further, is means appears; and 'What appears to him' means 'what he feels'; and being coincides with feeling, perception, and appearance.<sup>3</sup> But his sensation

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1 See Chap. V    2 Cf. Chap. III, sect. i    3 Theaet. 152a





is true to him only. He is the authoritative judge to himself alone of what is, and what is not. Socrates denies this: Theodorus asks, why it is false. In answer to this, Socrates says that he likes the Protagorean doctrine that what appears is; however, there is one lack that he did not investigate the declaration that a monster which has sensation, is also a measure of all things. If our sensations are true without exception, and each man's discernment is right, there is no need to go to Protagoras to be instructed that every man is the measure of all things.<sup>1</sup> Sensation thus proved to be relative and individual, and can not be the measure of truth.<sup>2</sup> Socrates proceeds with the argument from his own view point; since every human is agreed in thinking himself wiser than others, he is so superior in wisdom to others that he might be worshipped as if he were a god. The world is full of the wise and foolish. Thus, Socrates criticizes the Protagorean thesis that no one considers another ignorant or mistaken.<sup>3</sup>

Protagoras maintains that man is the measure not only of things in the present and past but also in the future. Rejecting it, Socrates argues thus: Would an untrained man, when he is going to have a fever, know it as well as his physician who attend him? And did they differ in opinion, should we say both are right?<sup>4</sup> If man were the measure of all things, he must be a wise man to be a measure.<sup>5</sup> With these illustrations Socrates refutes the theory that knowledge is perception resting upon sensation.

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1 Theaet. 161    2 Ibid. 166    3 Ibid. 170    4 Ibid. 178    5 Ibid. 183b



Man as regarded by Socrates is not simply a man; he is not a solitary man. By man, he means the human, or the universal man: in whom he attempts to find the measure of all things; from whose experience, Plato derives an ethical formula that may be applied to every individual. That is the universal measure and true knowledge.<sup>1</sup> In his conception, man is the infinite ideality and totality of men. And to find out this man is his chief and life-long work. For him the study of man is the main field of philosophy.

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<sup>1</sup> See further Chap. III in this writing.



## II. Man As Consisting of Body and Spirit

### I

What is the Platonic definition of man?---We must make this clear before we study the further conception of man in the dialogues. The members of the body are but instruments: there is something within, a power which cannot be seen. It may be called the real self or the soul. By man, Plato means, in a narrow sense, the real self which commands and uses the body. The Alcibiades shows "a singular identification of the soul with man,"<sup>1</sup> but the dialogue is generally considered as un-Platonic by recent critics; and it is difficult to think that Plato uses the term 'soul' ( $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ ), as identical with man.<sup>2</sup> In other dialogues he defines man as a being consisting of soul ( $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ ) and body ( $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ ).<sup>3</sup>

In the Laws, the Athenian stranger says that the soul is the most honourable part of man.<sup>4</sup> It is the highest of all human possessions; and "most truly a man's own." And it should be honoured next to the gods.<sup>5</sup> The beautiful is the symmetrical: and the symmetry of soul and body is the fairest of all things; if a leg or an arm is not symmetrical, it deforms a man's appearance, the same may be said concerning the rela-

1 Alcib. 130    2 Cf. Taylor, Plato, P. 27: I hardly agree with his interpretation of the Platonic conception of man. If it is not wholly misunderstanding, it would be difficult to give full appreciation.    3 Cf. Windelband, Hist. of Philos., P. 123; and Taylor, Plato, P. 525    4 Laws, 5. 731d.    5 Ibid. 5. 727





tion between body and soul.<sup>1</sup> The soul is superior and prior to the body; the soul has more essence than the body.<sup>2</sup>

The greatest good of man is, as in the case of a State, unity of soul and body: the fair soul in the fair body.<sup>3</sup> But even in this relation, the body is always the servant of the soul. The soul is unseen or immaterial; it is not a material product of Nature, as some materialists say, made from the four elements of the universe.<sup>4</sup> The soul is self-moved, a cause of motion: it is, however, "often made vicious by the influence of bodily pain."<sup>5</sup> Here, Plato acknowledges how close is the relation of soul and body. He obviously disapproves of the idea that man is simply the soul. The reason why the body is inferior to the soul is that motion, which is not self-moved is, in Plato's mind, inferior to a thing which moves itself. The body is, by its nature, subjected to the soul. The soul is superior because of its creative power, that moves other things.<sup>6</sup> He emphasises, this point, and says, 'in the present world the soul is imprisoned and entombed in the body.'<sup>7</sup> But these words must be understood only in the realm of religion in which the main theme is the problem of the soul, especially the immortality of the soul. That the body is the 'prison house' means, in the modern sense, that man is limited in his knowledge and physical existence. It seems unreasonable to understand that the Platonic conception of man, as we find it in the

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1 Tim. 87e 2 Ibid. 34e; Laws 10.892a, 896; 12.959a, 966e, 967b,e; Rep. 9.585d etc. 3 Rep. 5.462d, 464d 4 Laws 10.891 5 Tim 86; Soph. 228  
6 Laws 10.895; cf. Phaedo 71 7 Phaedr. 250; cf. Phaedo 106d: The expression is Pythagorean.



Alcibiades,<sup>1</sup> simply concerns the problem of the soul; or that man is a soul who uses a body; that "know thyself" accordingly indicates "know thy soul". Plato's conception is clearly different from this. He thinks of the soul always in certain associations with the body. He never insists that the soul exists in this world without the body. So far as we are concerned with the problem of the phenomenal world, man is consisting of soul and body, and the body is an instrument through which spiritual values shall be expressed. This affirmation we shall discuss later. In <sup>the</sup> Timaeus Plato describes the condition of the soul, in the phenomenal world, comparing it to the sea-god Glaucus, who is disfigured by an encystation of shells and sea-weeds. Continuing he says that, when the soul is planted in the body, many desires, which cause a mortal and immortal and a rational and irrational part in the soul, grow with it.<sup>2</sup> This is a suggestive illustration to the relation of soul and body. Here, the meaning of the soul is not identical with 'mind' but rather 'a living element', which must be the principle of life. The soul partakes of true knowledge of the Ideas while it also belongs to the realm of senses.

As a consequence of this conception of the soul, we must naturally investigate the essential faculties of the soul.<sup>3</sup> The divisions of the

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1 Alcib. 130 2 Tim. 68c Cf. The soul as the principle of change, we shall find a description of it in the Laws 10.904 3 As to the details we may discuss in Chap. IV.



soul as represented by Plato are three, namely, Reason, Spirit and Appetite.<sup>1</sup> When Reason controls Spirit and Appetite there results harmony, or virtue: It should be called evil if Reason is weaker than the other two. To keep the three in harmony and accord is very difficult for him. In the Phaedr., Plato explains the difficulty by using a metaphor, in which the soul is compared to a charioteer and pair of horses.<sup>2</sup> The soul is the driving power; the body is the 'earthly frame', and the union of these two is called a mortal creature, or man.<sup>3</sup> The body is the inferior possession; but it is the soul which judges the appetites, good and evil, of the body. The soul is not merely a ready-made power or spirit which is reproduced mechanically into the body. Nor is the body an entirely indifferent thing: it is the sole instrument that can be used by the soul in view of man's significance and situation in the world of sense or the physical world. The body is not simply an useless instrument. It has values and meanings, so far as ethics and religion are concerned. In many pages of the Platonic dialogues, we shall find this fact stated. Plato eagerly wishes to realize the ideal life in this phenomenal world. Plato's Republic is not the plan of a city in the air, but on the earth, where men, who have not only souls but bodies, are living.

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1 Cf. especially "The Division of the Soul" by F.M. Conford, art. in the Hibbert Journal, vol. xxviii, n. 2. Jan., 1930, Pp. 206-219 2 Phaedr. 246f. 3 Ibid. 246c; Soph. 247





## II

The soul, by reasoning, apprehends Ideas; the body, by perception, particulars. From this standpoint, Plato puts the emphasis on the superiority of the soul. The body is an obstacle to the acquisition of true knowledge and ultimate reality, or truth. For Plato, the objects of sense have no being (*οὐσία*), but merely becoming (*γένεσις*). He says that Pluto is the friend of man, for he releases the soul from the body.<sup>1</sup> Again, in his earlier dialogues, he states that the soul will be released from errors, follies and passions of the body, at the moment of departure this world, and going thence, she will join the company of the divine beings;<sup>2</sup> that the philosopher who purely departs this world will experience purgation; and for this reason he must refrain from fleshly pleasures, and not fear death: then his soul will behold the light of eternity and truth.<sup>3</sup> From the myths of Plato we would probably gather that man has true knowledge, so far as he abstains from bodily pleasures, or is in a state of purity. In these illustrations we perhaps find the Platonic conception of the immortality of the soul.<sup>4</sup> Thus, while Plato does not estimate the body, highly, yet before leaving the subject we must consider the fact that, on the other hand, he suggests that even in this life, we may, though imperfectly, behold Ideas or reality if we have the purpose to realize them.

Socrates as well as Plato shows that it is possible to find reality in the things of sense if we are absorbed in them. The soul is the bridge

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1 Laws 8.828e      2 Phaedr. 250      3 Phaedo 81-83      4 For further see Chap. V. P.



over the gulf between the two worlds; it is a Jacob's Ladder reaching to the realm of Ideas from the realm of sense. The Platonic relation of soul and body is not that of the Stoics who consider the body as almost an obstracle in the way of truth, or as a meaningless mechanisim; nor that of materialists who consider the soul as a product of mechanical conditions and of no value without the body. He insists on the spiritual value of the body as the most effective expression of the truth of ethics and of religion. And in this relation the environments of man in the world of phenomena are significant. He thinks that only of the human soul but the world-soul. The universe is metaphorically described in the Timaeus as a man who has soul and body.<sup>1</sup>

### III

To understand the relation of soul and body we must make clear the reason why and when tsoul and body have been united. Strange as it is man consists of two different and opposite elements; Plato says the soul is immortal, invisible and truth-loving while the body is mortal, visible and sense-loving. He declares that the harmonizing of this contradiction is the human ideal. To solve this fundamental problem Plato does not present to us a scientific interpretation but a mythological one, or more truly, a religious solution. From a story of Crea-

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<sup>1</sup> Tim. 31b, 32a, 34b, 41d, etc. Cf. Rep. 6. 508; 7. 518



tion, in the Timaeus, we gain a simple explanation of the problem; namely, the soul is determinately implanted in the body.<sup>1</sup> Plato suggests, however, in some other dialogues, that the soul is united with the body, because of the fall, in other words, innurification of the soul-life.

Thus, as Lodge finely indicates,<sup>3</sup> from the point of view of religion, man's life on earth is not of such moment; but from the ethical standpoint our earthly life is important in order to realize the perfection of the soul through the body, the only instrument of the soul. And the value and meaning of the body should be estimated in the sphere of ethics and morals, while the soul and its life chiefly concerns man in the sphere of religion. From these considerations it would be fair to say that Plato thinks man as consisting of soul and body; that man's ideal state of living, in the phenomenal world, is to realize the harmony of the soul with the body; that man must be religious and ethical to acquire true knowledge and virtues.

#### IV

Now, we shall briefly investigate the relation of man, possessing soul and body, to his physical environment---Nature. Plato recognizes that man is greatly indebted to his environment and that he

1 Tim. 42a ff      2 Phaedr. 246c; Laws 8.828 etc.      3 Cf. Plato's Theory of Ethics, P. 193



may be disciplined and educated to accord with his environment and circumstances.

In the Politicus ( or Statesman ) we read a story of the primitive life of man: according to which man was helpless, and lived among the wild beasts, without any knowledge and arts for a long time before Prometheus brought him fire and Hephaestus and Athene introduced the arts. In these circumstances man was provided with his food from Nature.<sup>1</sup> This description of the primitive life of man seems to be not original with Plato, but simply a reflection of the day. Plato thinks that man was created for the sake of the whole---the universe.<sup>2</sup> Man is but a minute fraction of the universe. His starting-point in this conception is that he compares the " Author of All" to a good artist who considers, first, the whole, and secondly, the parts. Under this comparison he indicates that the motion of the soul ( or the principle of change ) answers to that of the universe.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the motions of the two---the soul and the universe--- are the same. The universe is more significant, and the individual less. This does not mean, however, that man is less than Nature in every respect; but the lovers of knowledge are better teachers than are trees.<sup>4</sup> It suggests simply that man is a feeble creature in comparison with the universe.<sup>5</sup> Plato, like Socrates, teaches that man must be humble before God, his Creator; but he never degrades the position of man in relation to phy-

1 Polit. 274; cf. Protag. 321c    2 Laws 10.903    3 Tim. 90; cf. Phil. 30; Laws 10.896-898    4 Cf. Phaedr. 230e    5 Phaedo 107a





sical nature. He simply recognizes man's position in the universe: he recognizes man's weakness as well as his greatness---his activity is not limited merely to earth; that man is affected both in body and character by place and climate.<sup>1</sup> These influences are much more powerful than that of education or instruction. Plato brings us an instance of this truth, in reference to the character of the Egyptians and Phoenicians: they have a fair knowledge of arithmetic, but they are cunning rather than wise. This is due to certain natural causes. He declares that "there are great differences in the power of regions to produce good men: heat, cold, water and food, have great effects, both on body and soul." In his opinion, a good climate is indispensable to educate man perfectly; and the place, peculiarly favoured with climate, he thinks, is blessed by God.

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<sup>1</sup> Symp. 207d; cf. Laws 11.929c : Laws 5. 747



### III. Man and His Conception of the Ideal

#### I

Now let us consider the Platonic conception of the nature of human knowledge in relation to the true, the good and the beautiful. What is the ultimate ideal of a human being? What is true knowledge? ---will be the main subjects of the present enquiry.

Plato's enquiry into the nature of human knowledge is approached from morality and religion. The good is not, in his conception, identical with what is good. He attempts to find the knowledge of universals. By this means he tries to establish the criterion or principle of moral judgment; Two and two make four---why? We do not know why, or how it is so, but it is a universal truth. The proposition is not individual or particular, but the universal norm. This is the only key-word to a priori<sup>1</sup> knowledge. We cannot know anything independent of experience---the empiricists will say. From his standpoint there exists no absolute truth; all things are relative. But there must be a certain truth, independent of experience, which no one can disregard as it is universal truth. It may be called absolute truth; the unchangeable and universal measure of truth. If we have no measure such as this, we would have no science, no principle of morals. The empirical psychologist of today is proud of his

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<sup>1</sup> The term is used here in the meaning that knowledge independent of experience.



exactness of research, for he has made a great many experiments and observations. This "exactness" means, however, merely that it is exact empirically, or in relation to the number of experiments. We must examine the essence of phenomenal things, which Plato calls the Idea, or the universal. Thus, a priori knowledge is entirely different from empirical generalization. The proposition 'two and two make four'; and the proposition 'man is mortal' --- these two propositions are different in their nature and in the ground of judgment for each. Of course, even a priori knowledge is not wholly independent of our experience, if we speak strictly; yet, it is the only guide that leads pure knowledge into the realm of Ideas beyond the limits of the realm of phenomena,<sup>1</sup> or that of human experience. In this sense positive or empirical investigation is narrowly limited, and it is not adequate to study the problem of morals and ethics---to find the permanent law of human life. Thus, in the field of ethics as well as in that of religion, a priori knowledge alone can furnish on firm ground. Upon this foundation Plato establishes his system of Ideas.<sup>2</sup>

## II

For Plato knowledge is needful for the conduct of life. To get the

1 Russell with whom I hardly agree on this point. Cf. his The Problem of Philosophy (H.U.L.), P.117 f. 2 Between the empiricists and the rationalists there has been, and still is, a controversy. Locke, Berkeley and Hume belong to the former, Descartes and Leibniz to the latter.





knowledge or insight that indicates the right way of using every thing is the best way to realize true success in life--- to find goodness and happiness. Socrates teaches that man should recognize the need of moral wisdom, and that it is inexcusable that he should be ignorant and without true knowledge. Knowledge is unconditionally good.<sup>1</sup> Knowledge is the supreme aid in the realization of the ideal; it is the only guidance on the way to the vision of the good.

In the Republic we find the theory of the Idea of good (*ἰδέα τἀγαθοῦ*). We are, however, little informed about the nature and proof of its reality. But, it is clearly true that the philosopher's most significant study is to find this supreme object of knowledge---the Idea of good, or the good. And to carry out this study Plato employs not only the mathematical method but, as the most perfect, the dialectic method.<sup>2</sup> This is the only method that gives us true knowledge, or science.

The reason why Plato loves the mathematical method is that it gives us the exact knowledge in place of assumptions; and also, it gives the right method of deducing implications.<sup>3</sup> But the method falls short of the ideal science. It must be reinforced with the dialectic method.

**Knowledge and Sensation:-** The body is the instrument of the soul: and it is sometimes a hindrance to the soul. In this standpoint Plato dis-

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1 Cf. Protag. 313, "Knowledge is the food of the soul." 2 Rep. 7.531d

3 Cf. Pythagorean philosophy. Plato has been influenced from it.



trusts the sense, though even the soul is not independent of sensation in thinking. It fails to comprehend the true, the good, and the beautiful, or in general, the reality (οὐσία).

Knowledge and Opinion:- For the purpose of practical use Plato approves the value of right opinion (ὀρθὴ δόξα).<sup>1</sup> It is a substitute for true knowledge so far as our moral practice is concerned. It is, however, not to be mistaken for true knowledge. Beliefs are not sound: they are, like the statues in the fable of Daedalus, liable to move, if they were not fastened in places.

Sensation has nothing to do with geometrical truth; for instance, no geometrical line, triangle,<sup>or</sup> point can be draw on paper. The geometer, when he speaks of them, means, always, the invisible figures--- the line, the triangle, and the point; if not, the foundation of his demonstration of the propositions about them will be entirely false. The whole system of geometry will disappear as nonsense. The object of thought and that of sense: There must be a distinction between things what are to be (οὐσία), and things what are becoming (γένεσις). Plato's distinction between knowledge and sensation may be chiefly based upon such deduction as this. And he emphasizes the fact that we must not be deceived by appearance for reality. We must not <sup>see</sup> things with our bodily eye, but "with the mind's eye."<sup>2</sup> The Ideas must be apprehended only by the soul's reasoning (λογισμός); particulars by the body's sensation.

1 E.g. 'belief' or 'judgment.' For further, see A.N. Whitehead's Process and Reality, P. 126. Crito 98 2 Cf. Theaet. 185; Phaedo 99e



Thus, the Ideas must be apprehended by neither sensation nor opinion, but by true knowledge, by the philosopher.<sup>1</sup> The knowledge of Ideas is supposed to be the knowledge which was acquired before our birth and which was forgotten at that moment and rediscovered by the use of the senses-- a recollection of the knowledge of a previous state.<sup>2</sup> In other words, it is an a priori knowledge, if we speak metaphisically.

### III

Plato's theory of knowledge is chiefly dealt with in the Theaetetus. We shall reexamine his criticism of knowledge in this dialogue in which he criticizes the three definitions of knowledge. Plato attempts to show, in this dialogue, that knowledge is not identical with sensation nor with thought. Theodorus' and Theaetetus' answer to the question -- "What is knowledge?"-- is that 'knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) is sensation (αἴσθησις).'<sup>3</sup> In this conception, knowledge is no more than sensation: and appearance (φαντασία) and sense (αἴσθησις) are identical.<sup>4</sup> The first definition of knowledge is the same with that of the Protagorean;<sup>5</sup> and also with the

1 " Until the person is able to abstract and define rationally the idea of good, and unless he can run the gauntlet of all objections, and is ready to disprove them, not by appeals to opinion, but to absolute truth, never faltering at any step of the argument--- unless he can do all this, you would say that he knows neither the idea of good nor any other good; he apprehends only a shadow, if anything at all, which is given by opinion and by science; ..." Rep. 7.534 . Cf. Laws 12.965    2 Phaedo 75. This is one of the proofs for the immortality of the soul. See further, Chap. V    3 Taylor renders the word here by perception; Plato, P. 325 n.3 Cf. Burnet, Gr. Philos. i. P.231: Jowett translates the word, Sensible perception; Dial. of Plato, iv. P.115 & 143    4 See P. 5 ; Theaet. 152a    5 'Man is the measure of all things.'



fundamental thought of the philosophy of the universal flux of Heraclitus. The Protagorean relativity of knowledge is accepted as a popular definition for a time until the thesis is destroyed by the <sup>o</sup>funder himself as insufficient. He would attempt to prove that sensible perception is true. It is, however, inconsistent with the theory of flux; according to which our thought and the meaning of words cannot be defined at any instant.

We must discover a principle which exists in the mind and which is more creditable than sensation. Theaetetus therefore presents another definition of knowledge--- ' Knowledge is true opinion.' But, there must be a certain possibility of false opinion: knowledge is not true opinion, or judgment.

A third time Socrates asks, " What is knowledge?" The answer is ; ' True opinion, with definition or explanation ( or reasoning).' It is difficult, even for Plato himself, to give a definition of knowledge by pure logical arguments. His intention is that if he indicates a new method, new proposition for philosophical problems, his purpose is almost realized.<sup>1</sup> Because the age of Plato still has no clear distinction of the terms for subject and object, no analysis of sense and thought.<sup>2</sup> Plato criticizes contemporary ideas of knowledge, yet he does not construct his own theory of knowledge out of them. The age does not want to have, in a modern sense of the terms, a theory of knowledge. Indeed, the word science simply suggests the mathematical sciences which give us the

1 Theaet. 150; Socrates as the man-midwife of thought. 2 Jowett, Dial. of Plato, iv, P. 120





knowledge of universal.<sup>1</sup>

In the following pages we shall take up, in more detail, the problem discussed in the dialogue. It may be naturally divided into three parts with an exception of the dramatic introduction at the beginning.<sup>2</sup>

Theodorus might claim to be a chief figure in the dialogue, but he is old and Theaetetus, much younger, takes his place. The argument starts with the question, "What is knowledge?"<sup>3</sup> The answer is: knowledge is the science of geometry, of arithmetic, the industrial arts---shoemaking and so on. Socrates is hardly satisfied with the answer, for he gives no explanation of the nature of these sciences. Therefore Socrates again asks Theaetetus, "What is knowledge?"<sup>4</sup> His answer now is, as already mentioned, 'knowledge is sensation( or perception).' Socrates criticizes this answer, using for illustration, the wind.<sup>5</sup> He disproves the Protagorean relativism. Theaetetus naturally agrees with Socrates because he does not know the basic principle of Protagoras.<sup>6</sup> Then, Socrates proceeds further with the doctrine of flux, according to which all things are motion, all phenomena come out of the action and passion of motion; both sense and the objects of sense. As a result, nothing is, but becoming and there can be no fixed still for anything. After this Socrates asks Theaetetus, "Then once more: Is it your opinion that nothing is but what becoming?-- the good and the noble, as well as all the other things which we were just now mentioning?" Theaetetus readily recognizes the

1 Cf. Theaet. 146 etc.    2 Ibid. 142-151    3 Ibid. 146    4 Ibid. 151e  
5 Ibid. 152; See also the previous chapter.    6 Ibid. 155



truth in his argument and the falseness of the doctrine of this 'charming speculation' of his day.<sup>1</sup> He continues: the same wine may be sweet to him who is well, but on the contrary, bitter when he is ill. This means in other words, "To myself I am the judge of what is and what is not."<sup>2</sup> The same meaning may be found in the doctrine of flux maintained by Homer and Heraclèitus, and also in the Protagorean saying "Man is the measure of all things;" and in Theaetetus, "Knowledge is sensible perception." Theodorus asks Socrates if all this relativism is wholly untrue or not? Socrates replies that he is not a bag full of theories, all come from him who talks with him. He is broad-minded enough to appreciate the doctrine of Protagoras --- what appears is, is --- so far as it is based upon truth.<sup>3</sup> He attacks the theory in the following way: a pig has sensation, and it is a measure of all things. Since its sensation is changeable if it is true, all that he judges is always true. Accordingly there need be no instructors and philosophers in this world; in fact, there are many varieties of knowing among us. Thus, he insists upon the need of the reexamination of the Truth of Protagoras by the dialectic method, means of which popular ideas must be investigated. Socrates proposes other illustrations---if we cannot know, as the theory holds, what we remember, not-seeing it at this moment, then the knowledge of a thing which is remembered is not known.<sup>4</sup> To these arguments of Socrates, Theodorus makes a reply.<sup>5</sup>

1 Theaet. 157c,e: 'Knowledge is perception' is so popular words in these days. 2 Ibid. 160d 3 Ibid. 160 4 Ibid. 163b-164b 5 Ibid. 166-168



Again Socrates renews the argument, quoting Protagoras' own words -- 'What appears to each man is such to him.'<sup>1</sup> Socrates says: If a man thinks himself wise while others are fools, Protagoras denies his own doctrine; for "he acknowledges the truth of their opinion who believe his own opinion to be false; for he admits that the opinions of all men are true."<sup>2</sup> Thus, Socrates clearly leads the argument to the conclusion that Protagoras' truth will be true to nobody, including himself.

While Socrates reaches this conclusion, he does not entirely destroy the doctrine, but admits some truth in the saying, so far as sensations are concerned, though it can scarcely be extended to opinions or judgments. His speaking is often ironical, yet in keeping with the manner of a gentlemann and philosopher who speaks more freely than lawyers.<sup>3</sup> He describes the superiority of philosophers, and says that they are not concerned about their neighbors but are anxious to search into the essence of man.<sup>4</sup> He defines the ideal type of man as the philosopher. Theodorus confesses that if Socrates' words were appreciated by every man there would be less evils and more peace among them. But, Socrates declares that evils cannot be separated from human nature in this world, and "we ought to fly away from earth to heaven as quickly as we can; and to fly away is to become like God, as far as there is possible; and to become like him, is to become holy, just, and wise."<sup>5</sup> His ideal of man is therefore "to become like God."<sup>6</sup> God is the highest ideal

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1 Theaet. 170a      2 Ibid. 171a      3 Ibid. 173a,b      4 Ibid. 174      5 Ibid. 176a      6 As to the nature of the Platonic God, we shall discuss it later.





for the personality of man. He is perfect righteousness; and he who is righteous among us is nearest to him.<sup>1</sup> And to know this is the only wisdom. After these arguments Plato again introduces the doctrines of Protagoras and of Heracleitus putting the words into the mouth of Socrates.<sup>2</sup> He criticizes them by using illustrations from sickness, vine-growing, cooking and what not.<sup>3</sup> His main point against the Protagorean doctrine is that one man is wiser than another, and the wise man must be the measure. Theodorus cannot but approve his refutation of Protagoras.<sup>4</sup> Then, Socrates ironically discusses again the doctrine of the universal flux. He insists that the theory --"knowledge is perception"-- shall be refuted because it is based on a perpetual flux. Thus, the discussion is finished: and now, Theaetetus wishes to hear the opposite doctrine, or the doctrine of Parmenides.<sup>5</sup> Socrates, however, hesitates to enter on the question because he is afraid that they might not understand the words of this great 'venerable and awful' old philosopher. He turns the discussion in another direction.-- "Knowledge is perception." If this is true, we must not forget that we see and hear either with the eyes and ear or through them. To this, Theaetetus replies: through, not with. But this occasion Socrates intended to substitute through for with: sensible things are perceived with the mind and also through the senses. Besides, objects of sense, there are, Socrates insists, mathematical and some other abstractions--- being and not-being, likeness and unlikeness, and what not which

1 Theaet. 176b    2 Ibid. 177c    3 Ibid. 178b-e    4 Ibid. 179b    5 Ibid. 183c



the soul itself perceives. And this conclusion is this: "Knowledge does not consist in impressions of sense, but in reasoning about them; in that only, and not in the mere impression, truth and being can be attained."<sup>1</sup> And perception is not knowledge or science.

#### IV

The first part of the argument is, as we have observed here, thus completed. The next question is "What then is knowledge?" for we have discussed what knowledge is not.

Theaetetus answers, Socrates' question, "knowledge is true thinking, or opinion or judgment."<sup>2</sup> His answer does not, as he himself confess, completely satisfy him. He thinks there will be a false opinion beside the true one. Socrates denies the existence of false opinion in the realm of knowledge for "all things and everything are either known or not known:" further, "for if all things are either known and unknown, there can be no opinion which is not comprehended under this alternative, and so false opinion is excluded."<sup>3</sup> In the next examination of this problem Socrates removes it into the realm of being: False opinion is impossible; for a man cannot see something while he is seeing nothing. Because "if he thinks about nothing he does not think, and not thinking he cannot think falsely."<sup>4</sup> We cannot say that good is evil, and evil good; or that odd is even. It is impossible to conceive one thing as another. Socrates now presents his definition as follows: "to form an

<sup>1</sup> Theaet. 186d    <sup>2</sup> Ibid. 187b    <sup>3</sup> Ibid. 188b,c    <sup>4</sup> Ibid. 189a,b; Jowett, Dial. of Plato, iv, Pl38



opinion is to speak, and opinion is a word spoken, --- I mean, to oneself and in silence, not aloud or to another."<sup>1</sup>

But, as the argument goes on, Socrates needs to amend his former statement; and he presents to us a catalogue of possible and impossible mistakes.<sup>2</sup> As a result, a false opinion is possible when thought and sensation are wrongly combined. But in the next place, a question arises in the mind of Socrates; viz. might there not be error even in pure thought, such as in respect to number?<sup>3</sup> No one can confuse a man and a horse, yet he might easily err in mathematics, for instance, adding five and ~~seven~~to make eleven.

The argument now comes to its last stage. Socrates wishes to define the meaning of knowledge. He complains of himself, because of his lack of skill in dialectic;<sup>4</sup> yet he undertakes to explain the meaning of 'to know.' It means 'to have' and not 'to possess.' Socrates is afraid that man possesses knowledge without having it. By having he

1 Theaet. 190a 2 Ibid. 192a-c: "Confusion is impossible, (1) between two things not perceived by sense, when we know one or both or neither of them; (2) between two things when we have a sensible impression of one or both of them; (3) still more impossible between two things, both of which are known and perceived, and of which the impression coincides with sense; (4) between two things of which both or one only or neither are known and perceived and have an impression corresponding to sense. Confusion arises when for things always known and perceived we mistake other things, either known, or perceived and not known, or both known and perceived." Jowett, Dial. of Plato, iv, Pp.255-6 3 Theaet. 195d-196 4 Ibid. 195e-196a: "Theaet. 'But if you avoid these expressions, Socrates, how will you ever argue at all?' Soc. 'I could not, being the man I am. The case would be different if I were a true hero of dialectic: and O that such an one were present! for he would have told us to avoid the use of these terms; at the same time he would not have spared in you and me the faults which I have noted...' "



means ' having in use.' He illustrates this as follows: Even if a man has wild birds in his aviary, it may be said that he has none of them but merely possesses them. Again, the possession of the birds is not identical with the having of them in the hand.<sup>1</sup> He compares this aviary to the mind; the birds are kinds of knowledge: When we are children, the aviary is empty. And the acquiring of knowledge or science must pass through three stages; in the earlier stage, knowledge is to be captured, then it must be caged and at the same time examined as to its true, and finally it must be recaptured for use. Thus, the proposition that ' we do not know what we know ' may be demonstrated as follows: knowledge is at first a new mechanical possession, then an unconscious possession, and finally a conscious possession for use.<sup>2</sup>

For a time, this explanation of the existence of true and false opinions seems satisfactory. But there arises another question; viz. ' might not one having knowledge present with him and in his mind, still know nothing and be ignorant of all things?'<sup>3</sup> Theaetetus suggests the existence of a form of knowledge and that of ignorance; in other words, "he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion."<sup>4</sup> It is, however, not a perfect solution in this case; for of a man who thinks his opinion is true, it may be said that he has at least captured knowledge, but hardly, that he is wholly ignorant. Theaetetus attempts in vain.

1 Theaet. 197c

2 Ibid. 198d,e : Jowett, Dial. of Plato, iv, P.264

3 Theaet. 199d

4 Ibid, 200d





## V

Thirdly, they must go back to the original question---'What is knowledge?'<sup>1</sup> There must be another and best definition of knowledge. Theaetetus still clings to the old definition--" knowledge is true opinion."

Now, Socrates attempts to show that true opinion is not always knowledge, by using instances of orators and judges in the courts.<sup>2</sup> A judge may argue about the matter, and form an opinion that will be available to settle it. This requires no true knowledge. This calls forth another definition from Theaetetus; --Knowledge is true opinion accompanied by a reason or explanation. This comes near to the definition of knowledge desired by Socrates,<sup>3</sup> though it is somewhat different in its form. He asserts that the simple elements of knowledge cannot be defined but simply named. They are merely the objects of perception and cannot be known. Their combinations only give definition or knowledge.<sup>4</sup> This is probably correct: yet in the mind of Socrates arises a new difficulty, namely, in case " the elements or letters are unknown, but the combination or syllables known."<sup>5</sup> The hypothesis is, however, soon refuted by the test as follows: for instance, the first syllable of SOCRATES is SO.

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1 Theaet. 200d    2 Ibid. 201b    3 Ibid. 201d; "Let me give you, then, a dream in return for a dream:---Methought that I too had a dream, and I heard in my dream that the primeval letters or elements out of which you and I and all other things are compounded, have no reason or explanation."

4 Ibid. 202a,b    5 Ibid. 202e



And the S and O cannot be explained except as letters. Children begin their reading first with the learning of letters then the syllables. So is the harp-player taught first of all the notes of the instrument. Thus, the hypothesis is entirely nonsense.

Knowledge is right opinion with rational definition or explanation. What then is the meaning of 'explanation'? <sup>1</sup> In the first account, it may mean the reflection or expression of thought: but there is nothing extraordinary in that. In so far as a man is not deaf and dumb, he can express his thoughts. A second account of it is that it is "an enumeration of the elements out of which anything is composed." <sup>2</sup> When we are asked, e.g. what a wagon is, we may say that it consists of wheels, axle, body, rims and so on. To take another case, when one writes the name of some one, he may enumerate the syllables without knowing them but simply the order of the letters: he has right opinion, we may say; yet he has not true knowledge. After these first two meanings of the word are rejected; there is introduced the third.

It is true opinion which notes a mark or sign of difference by which a thing may be distinguished from others. <sup>3</sup> We may see a man, e.g. every member of whose body is complete, like that of the ordinary man. In such case as this we cannot distinguish him from other men, since we cannot recognize any peculiarities in him. If we have a sign of difference it might be said that we have knowledge. But in such simple opinion we have no real knowledge. It is obviously insufficient to

<sup>1</sup>Theaet. 206c,d      <sup>2</sup> Ibid. 207b      <sup>3</sup> Ibid. 208c



say that to know is to acquire the knowledge of difference.<sup>1</sup> Thus, Socrates reaches the conclusion that "knowledge is neither sensation nor true opinion, nor yet definition and explanation accompanying and added to true opinion."<sup>2</sup> Out of this indefinite conclusion Socrates and Theaetetus gain nothing of the expected results of the question being left unresolved. Yet Socrates lets Theaetetus that it is good for man to know that he knows nothing.<sup>3</sup> Socrates' conclusion, concerning the nature of knowledge, is negative: it suggests 'That knowledge is not.'

Plato's most remarkable contribution to the problem of knowledge is that there is knowledge of universals, that knowledge is not relative or sensible perception, that we must examine the meaning of words which we vaguely use.

Knowledge of phenomena or things and that of Ideas or truths may be considered the sources of our knowledge: the latter may be called intuitive or self-evident knowledge. Thus knowledge that chiefly concerns the field of logic, of arithmetic, and of ethics, is intuitive knowledge. With regard to this knowledge we have this difficult problem: Our opinion is sometimes false, as we have considered. Plato's main attempt is to find what knowledge is essential and necessary. In a word, Plato attempts to gain true knowledge which may be derived from a priori knowledge plus pure empirical knowledge. And in this sense we may say that his merit in the history of philosophy is great.

1 Theaet. 209e    2 Ibid. 210a    3 Ibid. 210c





His criticism of the nature of knowledge is the first attempt of the kind. He reaches a negative result, as many philosophers do; but that does not mean that man is wholly incapable of having true knowledge, even if there are limits to his knowledge.<sup>1</sup> Plato's theory of knowledge is not absolute scepticism but the new criticism of his day. He does not like to live a life "imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nation."<sup>2</sup> He imagines a real and ideal life that may be won by intellectual contemplation.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. B. Russel, The Problem of Philosophy, P. 240; "It is true that this is partly accounted for by the fact that, as soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a separate science." <sup>2</sup> Ibid. P. 243



## VI

The true, the good, and the beautiful---these are the highest things to be universally desired. They are not separated each from the other, but constitute the trio of abstract truth of the Platonic ideals. In other words, the good is the highest knowledge of human beings, and it "must be pursued in the spirit of a philosopher."<sup>1</sup> The Idea of the Good is the highest: it is hard to know clearly,<sup>2</sup> yet if a man does not know its nature, he will have nothing in this world. In the age of Plato, some said, the good is wisdom; others, the good is pleasure, and again, others the good is the real. Plato does not identify the good either with pleasure or reality.<sup>3</sup> It is the cause of knowledge and truth, and it cannot be identical with the other two; but is fairer than they.<sup>4</sup> The Idea of the Good may be compared to the sun; it is the cause of growth, author of knowledge, as well as that of being. It is the unvarying and absolute power and dignity. The good is the end of human life; The ideal is to 'lift up one's eye to the Idea of good' and to live a life after it is the highest and best of being,<sup>5</sup> perfect and sufficient:<sup>6</sup> It needs no addition.

1 Rep. 6.505; 7.526e    2 Cf. Crat. 384b ; " Soc. 'Son of Hipponicus Hermognes), there is an ancient saying, that hard is the knowledge of the good.'"    3 Rep. 6.505; Phil. 20b;21    4 Rep. 6.509;" O incon-

ceivable height of beauty, which is above knowledge and above truth!"

5 Rep. 6.507b; 7.540a: 7. 518e    6 Phil. 20, 60



In the mind of Plato the distinction of the true, the good and the beautiful is not clear. They are obviously one Being interpreted from three angles. The good, for instance, is entirely identical with the beautiful.<sup>1</sup> The beautiful, or the true beauty, is not a fair face, or anything of that kind, "for all such things appear to be in a flux."<sup>2</sup>

In the Republic Plato remarks that truth is the aim of the philosopher; that men, in general, have no knowledge of true being, and no power of judging justice, beauty, and truth.<sup>3</sup> By the "philosopher", he means the man who is "lover of the knowledge of the eternal and of all truth," and hater of all falsehood. He is "spectator of all time and all existence." The philosopher is the ideal type of man. He is "free from cowardice and arrogance;" and has a harmonious, well-regulated mind.<sup>4</sup>

Plato says, in the Philebus, that truth is an element of the good. The good becomes the beautiful because "measure and symmetry are beauty

1 Cf. Lysis 216d; "Soc. 'For I affirm the good is the beautiful. You will agree to that?' Menexenus: 'Yes.'" Symp. 201b; (Soc.) 'The Love wants and has not beauty?' (Agathon) 'Certainly, he replied.' 'And would you call that beautiful which wants and does not possess beauty?' 'Certainly not.' 'Then would you still say that love is beautiful?' Agathon replied: I fear that I did not understand what I was saying. 'You made a good speech,' Agathon, replied Socrates; 'but there is yet one small question which I would fain ask:-- Is not the good also the beautiful?' 'Yes.' 'Then, in wanting the beautiful, love\* wants also the good?' "  
\* (Love in the Phaedrus and Symposium, means the mystical contemplation of the beautiful and the good. See Jowett, Dial. of Plato, i, P. 525)

2 Crat. 439      3 Rep. 6.484-486      4 Ibid. 487e



and virtue." 'Beauty, Symmetry and Truth are the three' but these may be regarded one Good.<sup>1</sup>

The trio---the true, the good, and the beautiful--- may be interpreted in modern language, the scientific, the religious and the aesthetic.<sup>2</sup> Of course, Plato does not clearly distinguish them in this way, for in his day there was no clear distinction between them as we have mentioned above.

We may say that the true, the good and the beautiful are the culture-values. To find them in our daily life is the highest ideal of man. We must, here, distinguish the term civilization from culture. Civilization is brought out of the mechanical accumulations while culture is developed out of the philosophical ones. Plato, as well as Socrates, was anxious, if the writer's observation is correct, to find out the fundamental elements of this culture-value, which ought to be the base of the cultural-life; which is the highest power of mental life in this world. In a word, our life must be based upon a philosophical ground such as this. That is the real meaning and value of our life. Bringing up our soul to this condition, is the ideal of man. To cultivate our soul in the scope of this ideal is to realize the personality, or the true nature of man. He searched for truth about the existence of the world in the sphere of culture value.

1 Phil. 64e-65a      2 Cf. F.H.Allport's "The Religion of A Scientist" art. in the Harpers (Monthly) Magazine, for Feb.,1930, P.354





## VII

As the judge of ethical problems, Plato puts the good man at the head. We shall now study the nature of the good man from the ethical point of view.

The good man hates the tyrant: for the tyrant "seizes the treasures in the temples, and when these fail, feeds upon the people."<sup>1</sup> He knows evil not by the practice of it but by the observation of it.<sup>2</sup> But, he is not always good by nature, for virtue is sometimes teachable.<sup>3</sup> The good man is the man of self-respect, and he does not like to imitate anything. He has a creative mind in performing good actions and words.<sup>4</sup> He "implants justice" and hates injustice.<sup>5</sup> He is the friend of God and more like him than others. It is like an old saying---'Like agrees with like.'<sup>6</sup> In the Apology, Plato describes Socrates as the typical good man who fears nothing of evil in the lives of others.<sup>7</sup> He disregards all impediments, and will prefer exile rather than to be governed by inferiors, even enduring all trials.<sup>8</sup> He loves the righteous and hates the wicked.<sup>9</sup> And he is also gentle and passionate.<sup>10</sup> He does not grieve or laugh too much;<sup>11</sup> and we may say that the good man is, in the Platonic conception, a man who controls himself.<sup>12</sup>

1 Rep. 8.568a    2 Ibid. 3.409a    3 Meno 89    4 Rep. 3.396    5 Gorg.  
504; Cf. Apol. 28a    6 Laws 4. 716d    7 Apol. 30d, 41    8 Laws 6.770e  
9 Laws 10.908    10 Laws 5.751d    11 Rep. 3.387; 10.603e-604a    12 Laws 1.  
626, 627, 644b



There is no clear distinction between the good man and the just man; between the good man and the wise man. Their natures are interwoven. The just man is gentle.<sup>1</sup> A man who is temperate or good is just, brave and pious; and he can attain "the perfection of goodness and therefore of happiness."<sup>2</sup> And the just, good, and pious man is called the friend of gods.<sup>3</sup> The just man is also called the best man, who is "the most royal master of himself."<sup>4</sup> He acts, as the good man does, "harmoniously in every relation of life," or it means that he must keep the "health and beauty and well-being of the soul."<sup>5</sup> Thus, the nature of the good man and of the just man is almost the same.

In the Republic, the wise man and the good man are totally identical.<sup>6</sup> The ideal character of the wise man is self-control. He who has "united temperance, justice, and wisdom in his soul." He honors knowledge, and enjoys the good health for he wishes to keep the perfect harmony of body and soul. Wealth is not always contemptible; yet he fears it for the increase of it would bring him a discordance of the soul.<sup>7</sup>

In the mind of Plato, the good man is the perfect ideal type of man: It may be said that the good man is identical, with inner character, with the just, wise, and temperate man, gentleman, wiseman, philosopher, best man and the like.<sup>8</sup> In this sense, we can scarcely agree with R.C.

1 Gorg. 516c    2 Ibid. 507    3 Phil. 39    4 Rep. 9.580; Cf. 3.396; Laws 1.627.644b    5 Rep. 4.443-444    6 Ibid. 1.350b    7 Ibid. 9.591  
8 Laws 9.785c; Rep. 9.580



Lodge's distinction among these types of manhood.<sup>1</sup>

Plato describes, in general, the ideal man as the man of self-control, who has a rational mind for human affairs, who has, at the same time, love for the search after truth. And he must combine these two in one in his practical life. Thus, the life of harmony is his ideal. And he who realizes it is the friend of God, and of all men.

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1 Cf. His Plato's Theory of Ethics, Pt.i, a-h





#### IV Man in the Realm of Phenomena

##### I

The present chapter may be divided in general into two parts. In the first part, we shall deal with the problem of redemption, in the second, with the problem of education.

Plato does not mention distinctly what redemption, or salvation, is. But it is obvious that he had formed a certain conception of it. He says that man is not voluntarily intemperate; he is intemperate because of ignorance or lack of self-control:<sup>1</sup> he recognizes the existence of good and evil in the human mind.<sup>2</sup> To realize a temperate life, or a life of harmony, is his permanent ideal.

To the realization of this ideal, we may indicate, at first, the 'inordinate love of wealth' as one of the great obstacles. For it deprives the soul of holiness: A man will take all means to gain wealth, and thus, neglect other important things which are essential to the realization of the ideal life. "All is lost in desire of heaping up gold and silver; anybody is ready to do anything, right or wrong, for the sake of eating and drinking, and the indulgence of his animal pas-

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1 Laws 5.743b      2 Ibid. 1.626e



sions."<sup>1</sup> This is a hindrance to all things which are good. For such an one knowledge is only valuable so far as it is useful to gain money.

Beside the heaping up of wealth, there are pride, honor and beauty, for these one is deserted by God. A possessor of these things may seem great for a while, yet the destruction of his personality begins at the same moment with the gaining of these possession. Plato decries pride, honor and the like, for they are the elements of injustice.<sup>2</sup> By 'injustice' he means that:--" when anger and fear, and pleasure and pain, and jealousies and desires, tyrannize over the soul, whether they do any [immediate] harm or not, " they finally result in injustice.<sup>3</sup> He insists that our redemption is attained by the controlling of our passions and feelings. Every man should avoid self-love in order to accomplish his redemption. In keeping with this conception, it is desirable to keep oneself from extreme joy and sorrow.<sup>4</sup> This is the 'life of wisdom' in which man can live like the gods.<sup>5</sup> The true philosopher is not much interested in earthly strife, but in the eternal order.

Plato remarks that the soul is composed of three elements, namely, reason, spirit and appetite. In the Platonic conception, virtue is the harmony of these elements; reason, enforced by passion, governs the appetites: it is vice, or anarchy, if reason is controlled by the joint power of passion and appetite. Man is saved only by the former condition. Plato thus emphasizes the value of reason, as the faculty

<sup>1</sup> Jowett, Dial. of Plato, v,P. cxxv: Laws 8.831d, 4.705b, 5.742, 743

<sup>2</sup> Laws 4.716a    <sup>3</sup> Ibid. 9.863    <sup>4</sup> Ibid. 5. 734c    <sup>5</sup> Phil. 33b,c



which brings man into harmony in his mental life.<sup>1</sup> We may find his clearer conception concerning redemption, or salvation, in the following quotation from the Laws, viz. "Mind is the soul, and sight and hearing in the head, or rather, the perfect union of mind and sense, may be justly called every man's salvation."<sup>2</sup> He compares the union or harmony of mind and sense to the sailors and the pilot of a ship. When the obedience of the former, and the intelligence of the latter are perfectly united the ship and the lives on it will be safe. Intelligence or reason is the highest faculty. It is the light which guides the way to God. As the passengers depend for safety on the pilot, so man must live a secure life by the help of true knowledge, which alone gives us the right kind of life. This is called the knowledge of the best.<sup>3</sup> Plato's conception of redemption is thus entirely rationalistic. Redemption or salvation is only achieved by the employment of wisdom. Religious ceremonial has nothing to do with the salvation of the soul. God is most righteous; he is holy, just and true. To become like Him is to live a life of righteousness. And to know this truth is wisdom.<sup>4</sup> It is, also, called temperance.<sup>5</sup> In this sense, wisdom, with knowledge, or science, is the highest of human things.<sup>6</sup> It is concerned with the eternal.<sup>7</sup>

1 Cf. Laws 5.729, 10.906b    2 Ibid. 12.961    3 Alcib. 147a: The dialogue has been considered spurious, yet it conveys us some of the Platonic conception.    4 Theaet. 176c    5 Charm. 155    6 Protag. 352d; Theaet. 145e  
7 Phil. 59; cf. Phaedo 79a



In the Meno, Socrates indicates the goods of the soul: among them are temperance, justice, courage, magnanimity and so forth. They are some of the elements of perfect virtue. Add to them, either wisdom or folly, and virtue becomes according profitable or hurtful.<sup>1</sup> Wisdom has the governing power for other virtues; it brings about the soul's conversion from darkness to light.<sup>2</sup> Thus, to live a life according to reason is the 'greatest wisdom' which brings us the "noblest and greatest of harmonies."<sup>3</sup>

Such harmony as this may be realized only after death, one will say. For the soul is <sup>a</sup>pure, unmixed being. But, indeed, it is not so. Plato, with Socrates, says that our actual salvation from evil is only possible by wisdom which is evaluated as 'the gift of God.'<sup>4</sup>

The Platonic conception of salvation is well described in the words of Socrates:--"..If death were the end of all, the wicked would have had a good bargain in dying, for they would have been happily quit not only of their body, but of their own evil together with their souls. But now, in as much as the soul is manifestly immortal, there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom."<sup>5</sup> Thus, the Platonic conception of redemption is enforced by the basal idea of immortality. In other words, for Plato all ethical practice has, as its background, the religious meanings and ideals.

1 Meno 88a,d-e    2 Rep. 7.518    3 Laws 3.689    4 Phaedr. 278d; Rep. 7.519a  
5 Phaedo 107d





## II

Plato greatly appreciates the value of education both from the religious and ethical points of view. For him education is one of the effective factors which bring us redemption or salvation by means of wisdom. He insists that a good education is the fairest thing that improves body and mind. And he states the necessity of " infant education." This is not a matter of law but of precept; the mother's instruction for the child in the home remains free from the regulation of the Board of Education of the ideal community which Plato has imagined.<sup>1</sup> But, after this period, the system of education should be strictly regulated by the legislator, or, in this case, the head of the Board of Education. We may find this stated in the Protagoras, Republic, and Laws.<sup>2</sup> It is strictly prescribed that the boy and girl at the age of ten must begin to learn letters; and at thirteen, begin to handle the lyre and learn music until sixteen. It is needful to become a perfect scholar as well as musician. No alternation of these studies should be allowed by the boys and girls or their parents. For there can be no right spirit without a liberal education.

As to education for men and women, there should be no discrimination:

1 Laws 7.788 f. 2 Protag. 325, 326; Laws 7.810 f. Cf. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, Pt. i, P. 305 ff.



they should be taught the same. The only difference between the two sexes is that the former is stronger. The reason why they must have equal education is that inasmuch as women should pursue the same occupations as men this education should be the same. Plato declares that women must be taught gymnastics and music, and even "the art of war."<sup>1</sup>

Thus, education should be given to them at their earliest age, as soon as they understand the words; because it is 'the earlier, the better,' in order to know what is just and what is unjust.<sup>2</sup> Education is a life-long process in pursuit of true knowledge and wisdom.

A characteristic of the Platonic system of education is that he emphasizes education chiefly for the soul. Education in the ideal community is in general promoted by music for the soul, and gymnastics for the body. The soul is, as we have observed, the most precious possession of man, it is prior to the body. Why does Plato recognize the value of music as a method of education? It is because music conforms to the law of simplicity. And no one can do his work in the ideal community aside from this law. Man's ideal dwelling is a community in which education is highly esteemed, for thus, the beautiful soul would be cultivated in an atmosphere of harmony.<sup>3</sup> Music includes, in the Greek conception, of literature (λόγοι). In literature, Plato distinguishes that of the true and the false, e.g. fiction or fable.<sup>4</sup> In other words, he emphasizes not only education by science but by culture also. Education by music and gymnastics should begin as

<sup>1</sup> Rep. 5.451; Laws 7.804e  
376e

<sup>2</sup> Protag. 325d

<sup>3</sup> Rep. 3.401

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. 2.



early as possible; yet education by music is more precious than that by gymnastics. For the soul's excellence exceeds that of the body.<sup>1</sup> Bodily excellence is only realized under the influence of the good soul. Thus, physical exercises are ultimately designed for the soul. Athletics and sports are not to be professional. 'Game for game' is foolish. Plato would never have dreamed of the popularity of foot-ball, which now seems to be the religion of the university, in the United States. We must restore gymnastics, in its true sense, i.e. 'sport for life.' It must contribute to the "improvement of the soul" or the realization of perfect personality.<sup>2</sup> It is also effective by the conversion of the soul 'from night to day, from becoming (*γένεσις*) to being (*οὐσία*).'<sup>3</sup>

Plato thinks of man as an animal: yet he becomes the gentlest of all creatures if he is well educated, on the contrary, the fiercest, if ill educated.<sup>4</sup> Man is simply a civilized animal, and so he needs education through out all his life. Thus education is a most serious matter. Most of the time of everyday life should be spent in it, and Plato remarks that no one who is a lover of life and wisdom will take too much sleep, beyond the necessity of keeping in good health.<sup>5</sup> He indicates, however, that even philosophers, who are rare being, at times are corrupted by education if it is directed wrongly. Health, strength, and

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1 Rep. 3.403c,d      2 Ibid. 3.410b      3 Ibid. 7.521      4 Laws 6.766a  
 5 Ibid. 7.808



often virtues themselves, become the causes of evil if these are gained under unfavorable conditions, i.e. by wrong education.<sup>1</sup> In this respect, education must conform to reason and law. It aims to direct the youth "towards the right reason, which the law affirms, which the experience of the eldest and best has agreed to be truly right."<sup>2</sup> From the sociological point of view, the aim of education, Plato thinks, is to make a perfect member of the community, one who discerns what is good and what is not good, or one who knows virtue. To such an one, education is everything. It aims at ideals. Its method must be constantly renewed.<sup>3</sup> Plato is ready to introduce a new method of education which will be in accord with the time. It will be improved from generation to generation yet will never lose its power to furnish self-control.<sup>4</sup> Thus, it is intended to promote virtue. Education is, in the mind of Plato, considered an important thing as furnishing the means by which we know what is good. Without education, man is no more than the animal. Education does not aim at a luxurious mode of living nor at a higher position in business, but aims at true self-realization in this world. It aims at the more fundamental things of human life in the realm of phenomena. The educated man wishes to build up the culture of his ideal community, which would be the basis of all mental life. By education, man comes nearer to his ideals, and to God.<sup>5</sup>

1 Rep. 6.491      2 Laws 2.659      3 Ibid. 1.643, 644      4 Rep. 4.424, 425

5 Cf. Apelt, Platonische Aufsätze, "Das Prinzip der Platonischen Ethik" S. 106 ff.





## III

The four main elements of a good community, which are described in the Republic, include not only the virtues of the state but more of individuals. Wisdom (σοφία), courage (ἀνδρεία), temperance (σωφροσύνη), and justice (δικαιοσύνη), are the essential elements, or aspects of 'goodness' of the social and moral life of man. This is the ideal virtue of the Greek mind, and thus of Plato also.

He examines, first, the nature of wisdom. The wisdom of the statesman concerns the art of the whole community; unlike particular arts, such as the carpenter's or smith's. The statesmen are small in number; yet they have wisdom in behalf of the good of the community, and if the class is good enough to rule the community well, the whole community will be wise.<sup>1</sup> Wisdom, then, is the virtue of the statesman---or the knowledge adequate to an excellent administration of the community as a whole.

Courage comes next to wisdom. It may be ascribed to a certain soldiers. Courage is a kind of salvation: salvation that has to do with "the opinion respecting things to be feared, what they are and of what nature, which the law implants through education."<sup>2</sup> It is the power, or the will to resist all fear, such as fear of death. In other words, courage

<sup>1</sup> Rep. 4.428,429a      <sup>2</sup> Ibid. 429d: Cf. "Justice and temperance and wisdom are our salvation;.." Laws 10.906b. It may be remarkable that Plato here, does not mention about courage as one of them. It might be supposed that he has no clear distinction of each of them.



means to accomplish one's duty, or to do things which he believes as right, being free from fear. This may be called truth in the sphere of morals. Plato here uses a metaphor to illustrate the nature of courage in relation to education and laws. In dyeing of wool, we first prepare the white ground work with much care, and then lay the purple color and others upon it. A thing dyed in this way will keep permanent colors; nothing can wash them out of the ground work. This ground work stands for education; the colors are the laws.<sup>1</sup> Thus he shows the importance of education: it is the basis of our cultural life. Courage is the power which preserves right opinion against fear and pain.

Temperance is another word for harmony. In the constitution of the community, there are two classes, the lower and the higher. They may be compared with the two natures in man, good and evil. The better principle must govern the worse. So in the community, women and slaves should be ruled by the statesman who has wisdom. Temperance is, however, found in both classes.<sup>2</sup> And it is a kind of a harmony, because it "produces a harmony of the weaker, [and] the stronger and the middle class" without discriminating because of their power of wisdom, wealth, and the like. The same thing might be said in the case of individuals.<sup>3</sup>

The last of the four virtues is justice: Plato, however, does not give us a clear definition of it. There is no way which leads us to the place where justice is to be found; and "the word is dark and perplex-

1 Rep. 429a-430c

2 Cf. Protag. 323b; Laws 6.768, 777e

3 Rep. 432a



ing."<sup>1</sup> Yet we must proceed on into it as far as may be. In fact, we have found justice without knowing it; that is, justice is the original principle which constitutes the foundation of the ideal community.<sup>2</sup> Justice is the principle which suggests that "one man should practise one thing only, the thing to which his nature is best adapted."<sup>3</sup> In other words, justice is 'to do one's own business.' It is, then, "the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of the other three virtues of the community."<sup>4</sup> Here, we shall remember the famous words which Admiral Nelson gave his men in the battle of Trafalgar: "England expects every man to do his duty." This is justice. Doing another's business is evil and injustice, and leads to unhappiness.<sup>5</sup> By justice Plato means concentration upon the responsibility of doing one's own business.

The last of the four cardinal virtues of the community, so far as we can consider it here, is not clearly distinguished from the preceding three virtues. Man can live a true and real life by acquiring these four virtues, which constitute a true education. This is the real salvation of man from the realm of feeling phenomena, while he is still in the world. It is the only way by which man enjoys the life of being, not of becoming.

1 Rep. 432d 2 Cf. Meno 73e; Virtue is 'the power of governing.' See also Protag. 322e-323a 3 Rep 4.433a 4 Ibid. 4.433b,c; Cf. "For wisdom is chief and leader of the divine class of goods, and next follows temperance; and from the union of these two with courage springs justice, and fourth in the scale of virtue is courage..." Laws 1.631c 5 Gorg.



## V Man in the Realm of Ideas

### I

When we reach the problem of immortality, we at once face an inconsistency between the doctrine of Ideas and that of the soul. It involves also the problem of 'the good' of the Idea of the good, in relation with the Platonic God. The doctrine of Ideas, in general, is never introduced to us in the form of myth, but as a doctrine of the soul.

The confusion of Plato's argument for the immortality of the soul is due to the variety of proofs for it. Plato attempts to approach the problem from the ethical, mythological, and dialectical points of view, and these three elements are, in general, confused in the argument. The main point of the argument in the Phaedo is that the immortality of the soul is proved by the fact that the soul partakes of eternal ideas, therefore it is eternal or immortal. It is a doctrine of objective immortality, and it is possible to hold that the doctrine is a theory of knowledge. This view is true so far as this dialogue is concerned; it is, however, not the whole argument for the Platonic conception of immortality; for if we turn to the Republic, Gorgias, Phaedrus and Laws, there will be found a different proof for the immortality of the soul.<sup>1</sup> And now we

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Jowett, Dial. of Plato, ii, P. 170ff. See also P. 62f. in this writing. Cf. Laws 4.721c: Here Plato mentions that the immortality may be attained by the procreation of children. In Sym. 208e; a similar conception may also be found.





shall observe the doctrine in the Phaedo, keeping this fact in mind. 52

## II

The ideal of the philosopher is to enjoy a life of contemplation but not of action. His imagination and hope are fastened upon a place beyond the limits of bodily existence, or the the realm of phenomena. He is the lover of the vision of realities. He does not fear death and is ready to die because he is anxious to see a realm without the errors and misconceptions often produced by bodily hindrances. Contemplation of life, in the independence of the body, is his ideal. From this fundamental conception the Socratic doctrine of the soul has been developed. By means of reasoning on the soul, man can apprehend the Ideas; while by sensation of the body, he can grasp particulars.<sup>1</sup> And in order to achieve the knowledge of reality he hopes to be independent of the body, and its senses; and to live in the sphere of absolute being. In this world he can behold the vision of a reality only by the practice of the cultivation of the soul and the physical exercise of the body: it were much better to behold nearer and clearer the ultimate realities. In other words the realm of Ideas is the sphere of truth in which the soul beholds incorporeal existence.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Chap. III, and Phaedo 79c. Plato holds the opinion that the datum in the act of experience should be conceived in terms of Ideas or universals. This is perhaps an adequate understanding of him, in the modern sense.     <sup>2</sup> Phaedr. 247c



It is, however, true that, as Cebes suggests, men fear " that when she [the soul] has left the body her place may be nowhere, and that on the very day she may perish and come to an end-- immediately [up-] on her release from the body , issuing forth dispersed like smoke or air in her flight vanishing away into nothingness." <sup>1</sup> Such a fear as this is the natural and primitive idea, which leads us into an argument for the immortality of the soul. The Greeks, and likewise the mediaeval peoples, troubled themselves with this problem: they feared about the relation between the phenomenal world and the soul. The idea of the immortality of the soul arises from the fear of the death of the soul. So far as this idea is concerned, the immortality of the soul is not the result of a religious hope, but a confession of the fact that they do not know how to deal with the soul after the death of the body. Socrates, with Plato, gives us a solution about the problem, and his attempt is one of the great and successful arguments for immortality.

At the outset of the argument, Socrates refers to the Orphic tradition that the soul released from the body exists in ' the world below.'<sup>2</sup> His proof for the assumption is that " all things which have opposites

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1 Phaedo 70a      2 Ibid. 70b: " Suppose we consider the question whether the souls of men after death are or are not in the world below. There comes into my mind an ancient doctrine which affirms that they go from hence into the other world, and returning hither, are born again from the dead. Now if it be true that the living come from the dead, then our souls must exist in the other world, for if not, how could they have been born again?"



[are] generated out of their opposites;"<sup>1</sup> namely, less and greater, the weaker and the stronger, the swifter and the slower, the worse and the better, the more just and the more unjust, sleep and waking, and the like. So the living spring from the dead.<sup>2</sup> The Orphic world consists of opposites. It seems to Cebes a quite satisfactory conclusion as a proof of the immortality of the soul. Socrates proceeds that "if all things which partook of life were to die, and after they were dead remained in the form of death, and did not come to life again, all would at last die, and nothing would be alive."<sup>3</sup> Thus, Socrates attempts to prove the immortality of the soul from the Orphic standpoint. In the next Place, he proceeds further, and introduces to us the doctrine of reminiscence, which he presents in detail.

If knowledge, Cebes says, is recollection, our souls had been in existence somewhere beside in the world of phenomena, and therefore the soul may not cease when parted from the body. As in the case of geometrical demonstrations, he continues, if a question is given to a man right, he can form a right answer in his mind, so far as he has already knowledge and right reason,<sup>4</sup> or in other words the answer is not given by the questioner but is produced within the mind by association. And he knows what he does not now see but he has seen. This is recollection. And recollection may be derived from persons or things both like and unlike, the things seen in a former state. For instance the lyre may be associated with the player of the instrument. A material equality suggests

1 Phaedo 70e

2 Ibid. 71a-d

3 Ibid. 72d

4 Ibid. 73a



an absolute equality; and by visible equals we reason the idea of equality.<sup>1</sup> Mathematical equality is not the same as perceptible equality. And this knowledge of absolute equality must be acquired before birth, and yet it is forgotten at the moment of birth but is recovered through the use of the senses. We know, before birth, in the pure state of the soul, "not only the equal or the greater or the less, but all other Ideas," such as of beauty, goodness, justice, holiness and what not.<sup>2</sup> Thus, recollection is another word for the learning, which gives us the knowledge of Ideas, which we have acquired before birth.<sup>3</sup> The modern term for it is a priori knowledge.<sup>4</sup> The argument of Socrates (or Plato) in this dialogue has, as we mentioned before, some inconsistencies as related to the doctrine of Ideas in the later dialogues. But, it is certain that the pre-existence of the soul is in a "bread and butter" relation with the doctrine of Ideas. And Simmias as well as Cebes is satisfied with the proof that the pre-existence of the soul cannot be demonstrated without the assumption of the existence of the essence or Ideas.<sup>5</sup> But this proof is of no use for the future existence of the soul. This objection, Socrates answers by two arguments, viz. (a) the living is born of the dead, and this alternative circle to be endless, and (b) the existence of Ideas is the proof of the previous existence of the soul.<sup>6</sup> Thus the problem seems almost settled; yet there remains one question, that is, they fears that the soul might vanish into the

1 Phaedo 74a-c    2 Ibid. 75b-d    3 Cf. Phaedr. 148-250; Leno 81, 86

4 Cf. Taylor, Plato, P.188    5 Phaedo 77a    6 Ibid. 77d





air especially if it were a stormy day. The argument therefore proceeds further, from the logical to the physical realm.<sup>1</sup> The discussion starts again from the former position, that the soul and the Ideas are unchangeable at all time, and are invisible.<sup>2</sup> And, then, they must be perceived, not with the senses, but with the mind. "The seen is the changing, and the unseen is the unchanging." The body is akin to the former, and the soul to the latter.<sup>3</sup> The soul uses the senses only in the 'region of the changeable,' but when the soul passes into the "region of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and unchangeableness, which are her kindred, and with them she ever lives, when she is by herself and is not let or hindered; then she ceases from her erring ways, and being in communion with the unchanging is unchanging." And this state of the soul is, as we have already observed, wisdom (*φρόνησις*).<sup>4</sup> The soul governs the body in the region of the changeable, or the world of phenomena. The soul is akin to the divine; the body to the mortal.<sup>5</sup> As a supplementary proof, Socrates brings before us an Egyptian custom of dealing with the corpse: he remarks that even the body, after death, does not immediately decompose in the moment of death, but can be preserved for many years if the conditions are favorable. Even if the body decays the skeleton lasts.<sup>6</sup> How unlike that the soul should be dissipated at the moment of the destruction of the body, or departure on the way to the good.<sup>6</sup> Here, the argument for immortality is, if my observation is

1 Phaedo 78-84      2 Ibid. 78d      3 Ibid. 79a-c      4 Ibid. 79d

5 Ibid. 80a,b; 6f. Chap. VII in this writing.      6 Phaedo 80c,d



correct, presented from the point of view of materialism. It is difficult to recognize the argument as merely a metaphor; it is somehow outside the limits of the philosophy of Idealism.

The soul, in the world of the unchangeable Ideas, is released from all errors and passions. This is the state of the soul in the "divine and immortal and rational world."<sup>1</sup> In this respect, the philosophy of Socrates, as he himself defines, it is the philosophy of the study of death. But this should not be understood as a pessimistic philosophy. It is a philosophy of 'how to overcome death which every man will meet at least once.' And it also indicates the way we shall experience things in the world of Ideas, in the visible world. In other words, Socrates indicates that the ideal life of man is to live a life according to right intelligence or reason, and thus behold the light of truth,<sup>2</sup> both in this world and the other world, for the soul lives in both worlds.

Still, Simmias and Cebes have objections to raise against the conclusion of Socrates.<sup>3</sup> Simmias says that the argument seems to him insufficient: if the soul is invisible and incorporeal, and therefore immortal, it is acknowledged to be a harmony. And the argument may be explained by the relation ~~between a harmony and the~~<sup>4</sup> lyre:--

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1 Phaedo 81a    2 Cf. Ibid. 82; Here Socrates mentions about the transmigration of men into animals: the doctrine is Orphic, and also resembles with the Buddhistic one. See also the previous chapter in this writing.

3 Phaedo 84 ff.



"Suppose a person to use the same argument about harmony and the lyre-- might he not say that harmony is a thing invisible, incorporeal, perfectly divine, existing in the lyre which is harmonized, but that the lyre and the strings are matter and material, composite, earthy, and akin to mortality? And when some one breaks the lyre, or cuts and rends the strings, then he who takes this view would argue as you ( Socrates ) do, and on the same analogy, that the harmony survives and has not perished-- you cannot imagine, he would say, that the lyre without the strings, and the broken strings themselves which are mortal remain, and yet that the harmony, which is of heavenly and immortal nature and kindred, has perished---perished before the mortal."<sup>1</sup>

The difficulty of Cebes is as follows: He recognizes the argument of Socrates as a whole. But if the soul continues its existence much further than the body, it is hardly proof of the immortality of the soul. For the alternative circle of deaths and births will finally bring death to the soul. The soul's last body will survive as the coat, a man leaves after he is dead. And it will be ridiculous if we say that he is not dead because his coat remains. " This death and dissolution of the body which brings destruction to the soul may be unknown to any of us, for no one of us can have had any experience of it." <sup>2</sup> Thus, the discourse, of Socrates, seems to the audience to be made insecure by the

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1 Phaedo 86a    2 Ibid. 87a88b



attacks of these two. They are disappointed with the Socratic proof of immortality. Simmias attacks it from the epiphenomenalistic point of view of the Pythagoreans; Cebes from the Heraclitean standpoint.<sup>1</sup> Both criticisms are obviously based upon the principles of physical science; while Socrates proceeds with the discussion in the realm of religion. Here we see, as we have it today, a controversy between (physical) science and religion. To this biological and physical criticism, or scientific attack, Socrates wishes to give a solution. And the two criticisms are carefully, yet with some difficulty, examined by him in the remaining part of the dialogue.<sup>2</sup>

### III

Socrates is afraid that men may become misologists or haters of Ideas. Such misology comes from ignorance of the world. A simple-minded man will easily believe an argument to be true which will, in later time, be proved to be false, because of <sup>the</sup> lack of skill in dialectics. He does not know whether it is true or not, and in the end there remains nothing which he believes as truth. It is a most dreadful thing that he loses "truth and the knowledge of realities," while he gains an argumentative combat. Thus, Socrates does not wish to deceive his hearers as well as himself in the search for truth.<sup>3</sup> He proceeds then with his criticism of the arguments of Simmias and Cebes, who accept the

1 Cf. Taylor, *Plato*, P. 194 f.; Burnet, *Gr. Philos.* i, P. 87 ff.; Weber-Perry, *Hist. of Philos.* (1926), P. 21 ff. 2 *Phaedo* 88e-102

3 Ibid. 89-a-91c





doctrine of reminiscence, yet are hardly satisfied with the Socratic immortality of the soul.<sup>1</sup> Socrates first replies to the difficulty of Simmias, who thinks that the soul is a harmony of the body, or the soul is an epiphenomenon; and at the same time, acknowledges that knowledge is recollection, i.e. the pre-existence of Ideas. There is an inconsistency in the two propositions: Simmias put much emphasis on knowledge as reminiscence. Therefore, he must accept this proof that the soul exists before birth.<sup>2</sup>

Next, Socrates discusses the problem of Cebes:<sup>3</sup> At the outset of the argument, he gives his own experience, in trying to find a solution of the problem. He insists that no process of Nature can be perfectly interpreted by mechanism. He has approached the problem from the point of view of the biological theories of the Milesians and the Heracliteans; from the Alcmaeonean psychology; from the mathematical theory of the unite of Zeno. But, none of these has brought him a full solution of the problem of ethics and religion. He made himself acquainted with the doctrine of Anaxagoras, that mind or intelligence is the cause of all things. This teleological argument would seem to have been able to give him satisfaction, but in the end it failed to do so. The theory soon led him to mechanism which is strictly limited to the sphere of natural science.<sup>4</sup> He seeks to apply his deductive method to Ideas: if the existence of Ideas may be proved then the immortality of the soul will be

<sup>1</sup> Phaedo 91e-92a  
99d

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 92d

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. 95a-96a

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. 96b-99d



confirmed. Since Beauty is the cause of the beautiful, and Goodness the cause of the good; that which partakes of Beauty and Goodness must be like the eternal, by reason of the principle of causation.<sup>1</sup> To the fundamental problem of postulating the reality of Ideas, the final argument proceeds.<sup>2</sup>

#### IV

Socrates points out that opposite Ideas never exist at the same time, in the same person and thing. We may say that Simmias is tall and short; because he is taller than Socrates while shorter than Phaedo. But this is not an essential distinction but accidental or relative. From this proposition we shall affirm that ' virtue is not vice.'

Here, one person asks if this means that " out of the greater came the less and out of the less the greater." In replying to this question Socrates remarks that it is an affirmation of opposition in the concrete, but not in the essential. Cold and heat oppose each other; fire cannot co-exist with snow; it is impossible for heat to become cold or heat-cold. Another illustration is as follows: The triad, or number three, viz. an odd number, excludes the number four, or an even number; and they are opposed to each other. Again, in general, the odd, and therefore the number three which participates in oddness, excludes the even. The same principle applies not only to life, but to the soul, to which life is attributed, excludes death. The soul renders life to the body; this is a universal truth. The opposite to life is death.

1 Phaedo 99e-102a; cf. Phil. 30

2 Phaedo 102b-107b



" Then the soul, as has been acknowledged, will never receive the opposite of what she brings." The musical repels the unmusical; the just, the unjust. So the immortal does not admit death. The soul does not admit death, and therefore the soul is immortal.<sup>1</sup> Again, if the odd were not imperishable, so is three. The number three will not perish but will be removed. " And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also imperishable, the soul when attacked by death cannot perish. " <sup>2</sup> Then, when we face death, the body or the mortal portion of us will perish, but the soul, or the immortal portion will be indestructible. Our souls really exist in another world.<sup>3</sup> So far as we are concerned here, the immortality of the soul has been proved by the doctrine of Ideas. But it gives no significance for the conduct of life. And the argument developes into the field of ethics or morals. Plato here introduces an Orphic myth.<sup>4</sup> In other words he wishes to explain that since the soul is immortal, and good and evil will never pass away, it is greatly concerned with daily life.<sup>5</sup>

. . . . .

( In the Phaedrus, the proof for the immortality of the soul is quite different from the argument in the Phaedo. The soul is immortal be-

1 Phaedo 105e    2 Ibid. 106b; cf. Laws 10.904a    3 Ibid. 106e-107a  
 4 Phaedo 107a ff. Upon the interpretation of the Platonic beliefs and symbols which appear in the myth, I shall not touch here. I mention only the fact that Socrates, with Plato, emphasizes myth in dealing with the ethical problem of life, including religion and education.    5 Cf. Tim. 41a-d; Laws 10.904e



cause it is ever in motion; and never ceases. Its motion is originated from within: it is divine.<sup>1</sup> The body is moved from without, and it cannot be self-moved, therefore it is soul-less. Things which are moved by themselves have souls. Such motion is innate in the soul, and renders it self-moving.) <sup>2</sup>

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1 Phaedr. 245c ff. Cf. Aristotle's "Unmoved-Mover" as a representation of the nature of the Divine. See also the later chapter on the Platonic God, in this writing. 2 Cf. Rep. 10.611a; Laws 10.896d





## VI Man and His Permanent Law of Life

### I

Knowledge is the only permanent law<sup>1</sup> of life in the philosophy of Plato and of Socrates. Human nature, in the phenomenal world, is always drawing near to avarice and selfishness. Man, in general, avoids pain and pursues pleasure without right reason or wisdom. In an individual life and in community life as well, there is an increase of evils so far as circumstance remains without any improvement. If man were born gifted enough to apprehend the true, as in the case of God, there would be no necessity for the written law that rules over him at every turn. Unfortunately, man is not so; and he needs law, or order, as a substitute for true knowledge.<sup>2</sup> Thus, law is applied to a practical purpose. "The truth makes him free:" but the best man, he who himself is a law, is hardly to be found in this world. We need law, then, especially in our community or social life, as a conventional moral judge.<sup>3</sup> In the mind of Plato, man is represented as 'the most

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1 The term is used here in a broad sense. 2 Laws 9.875b-c; 12.957d

3 Ibid. 6.769d, 772; 8.846c : Cf. Ibid. 4.719



religious animal and the possession of God." This is the dominant idea of man in Plato's philosophy of religion.<sup>1</sup> Man is the animal plus something--- justice and religion.<sup>2</sup>

## II

We shall now observe Plato's conception of man in connection with animals. According to him, there are three classess of men, viz. lovers of wisdom, lovers of honor, and lovers of gain.<sup>3</sup> This is a simple classification of man, yet it suggests natural tendencies of human nature. He makes a discrimination regarding the nature of men and women. In the Republic<sup>4</sup> he discusses the problem as follows: First, the problem of the occupations of men and women is discussed. He recognizes that their occupations must be different according to the nature of the two sexes, since the different natures are useful in their particular ways. But in general, the natures of men and women are not fundamentally different from each other, they simply differ in their lines of occupations. Women often show capacities superior to men. They are the same in kind; the difference exists only in their suitabilities. He admits, however, that women are not superior to men because their capacity for virtue is so weak.<sup>5</sup> But this means, simply, that women are too weak to control themselves because of their sensitive natures. The natures of both sexes

1 Laws 10.902,906; Phaedo 62 2 Cf. Tim. 41e ; Menex. 237e 3 Rep. 9. 581 4 Ibid. 5.453-455 5 Laws 6.781b; cf. Crat. 392c



are the same and their education must be the same; there is hardly found any lack in women to receive the training of music and gymnastic. Thus, Plato acknowledges the necessity of co-education in the ideal community.<sup>1</sup> He is a feminist in the sphere of education: Has women the capacity of carrying out their will in political administration, he would admit that they take their place in government the same as men. According to Socrates, and likewise Plato, virtue is and is not teachable. Virtue is either entirely, or partly, wisdom, and it is only education that makes men and women virtuous.<sup>2</sup> Virtue is realized by reason that distinguishes good and evil, pleasure and pain, etc. And this reason becomes, when the community affirms its universality, law. For Plato, life according to reason is the ideal social life.

Plato thinks that man is naturally a moral creature; and that men are interested in others' virtues. Yet, he does not particularly desire to be virtuous.<sup>3</sup> He is slow to become good, and to believe the truth; therefore there is need of the written law in the community, from the point of view of social welfare, which will be realized only by the accomplishment of our duties towards our relatives and friends and our fellow-citizens.<sup>4</sup>

Man is the animal who desires always the fulfilment of his wishes and desires. This is generally recognized as the case whether one is young or old, wise or foolish.<sup>5</sup> But unreasonable hope or desire may lead to the

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1 Rep. 456    2 Meno 89    3 Protag. 327    4 Laws 2.663e    5 Laws 3.687



corruption and destruction of his personality, just as in the case of the vessel which has a too large sail, or the body which has too much food.<sup>1</sup> This is always the source of the tragedy of human kind. To avoid this tragedy, man must have reason or philosophy. There is no need of habit, for habit contributes nothing to him in real life. It is silly when one blames the gods, chance, or others, because of the failure of things he wishes to realize. First of all, man must blame himself and discover his mistakes and ignorance. To find this ignorance of himself is true wisdom; and by it man can come to live an ideal life.<sup>2</sup> The philosopher is, in a certain sense, the only kin of God. For wisdom must be the guide in all things.<sup>3</sup>

Plato's conception of the animal is, in general, derived from the contemporary notions of his day. It is presented in the form of a fable: and contains nothing especially his own. In the Statesman, Socrates tells us that God was the governor of the physical world--- the gods e.g. the sun, moon and stars were under His sovereignty--- and there was no dissension among them. In the days of Cronos also God governed man, just as man now ruled animals. From this story, we might suppose that Socrates, with Plato, thinks that man is a god to the animals.<sup>4</sup> On the contrary, in another place, Plato mentions that man is the most cowardly of animals.<sup>5</sup> He also thinks that man must follow the higher instincts of his nature.<sup>6</sup> This may indicate that it is a human instinct to wish to acquire true

1 Laws 3.691 2 Rep. 10.619c; cf. Laws 5.727b 3 Laws 10.899e  
4 Statesm. 271e 5 Cf. Laws 7.814b 6 Tim. 90





knowledge, and if man follows this instinct, he may be called a man, in the real meaning of the word. In general, Plato thinks of man as a religious animal: but he never indicates what animals besides man are in any sense religious. And it must be admitted that Plato's conception of man in the sphere of biology is quite naïve in interpretation. Naturally, he introduces fables when he wants to explain the creation of the world and man, without any strict examination of their contents. Man is selected, by the hand of Our Mother, out all animals: as having the most remarkable understanding and the notions of justice and religion.<sup>1</sup> Again, Plato confesses that man is a trouble-making animal.<sup>2</sup> The cause of his trouble comes from his ego-centric nature, he remarks, and he insists upon the need of law, especially in community life; for without it, he says, man is worse than the beasts. Man's first duty, he remarks, is the 'care of the public interests' which make sound the foundation of the community, and private interests must be secondary.<sup>3</sup> To seek the public good is to attain virtue; and it brings the soul enlightenment. The principle of ethics and morals of a community and of an individual is entirely the same.

### III

In considering the ideals of the community life of man, it is to be

<sup>1</sup> Laws 10.902; cf. Menex. 237e  
Protag. 322d

<sup>2</sup> Laws 6.777c

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. 9.875a; cf.



noted that Nature does not provide for man, as in the case of other animals;<sup>1</sup> and he must organize a community.

Plato remarks, that a community arises under economical conditions. The formation of a city or state is due to the fact that we cannot live wholly apart from society, because we have many wants; we cannot live independently of our neighbors. We need the aid of others in order to supply our varied requirements. "The most pressing of all wants is that of substance to enable us to exist as living creatures;" namely, first the need of food; second, that of a house and third, that of clothing.<sup>2</sup> These three fundamental wants of human beings are the cause of the constitution of a community of men. We may trace in this conception certain Greek ideals of life; viz. Greek architecture produced many beautiful temples, while their clothing was very simple. In this "give and take" problem, there is demanded strict morality; Plato calls it justice.<sup>3</sup>

Man is, according to Plato, also the only animal that has a notion of order.<sup>4</sup> Plato believes that virtue and vice are already planted in the mind of the child, as are pleasure and pain. In accord with the

1 Protag. 321c; Rep. 2.369a      2 Rep. 2.369a-d: Cf. The same thing has been said among Japanese. They say that they want (i) clothing, (ii) food, (iii) house, in this order. In this conception their national ideas are similar; they attach great importance to propriety. 3 Rep. 2.369d-e

4 Laws 2.653



gradual growth of the child's mind, reason controls both, and men may thus realized the harmony of the soul, while other animals cannot. The individual follows reason, the community law. Law may be social reason, i.e. conventional law. The idea that man is a puppet or plaything of God, is peculiarly recognized in the later dialogues of Plato.<sup>1</sup> Probably it is a characteristic idea of contemporary Greeks; but it seems a little different from his own mind.

"Every man should remember the universal rule," says Plato, "that he who is not a good servant will not be a good master; a man should pride himself more upon serving well than commanding well: first upon serving the laws, which is also the service of the Gods; in the second place, upon having served ancient and honourable man in the days of his youth."<sup>2</sup> Thus, he affirms the holiness of law. He never, in general, remarks about the penalty for the violation of law: the service of law is identical with that of God. Because the law aims at the highest good of the community. It must promote national as well as international peace and good-will: even in the case of war, it should be "an expression of ethical will"<sup>3</sup> or war for the sake of peace.<sup>4</sup> He despises the traditional authority of phenomena, such as oracles and the like. For the object of law is "to make men happy," or virtuous.<sup>5</sup> And law is powerful not only in the phenomenal world but in the next world, from the religious point of view.<sup>6</sup>

Law, thus, should be regarded as the virtue of the whole community; it must not be partial: it must be enforced by the actual conducts of

<sup>1</sup> Rep. 10.604b; Laws 1.644e; 7.803  
Hegel's Die Philosophie des Rechts  
3.693b; 12.963a      <sup>6</sup> Crito 54

<sup>2</sup> Laws 6.762e  
<sup>4</sup> Laws 1.623c

<sup>3</sup> A phrase in  
<sup>5</sup> Ibid. 1.631b;



every member of the community, especially the rulers or statesmen.<sup>1</sup> The ideal law is impartial toward all classes of the community. Socrates, with Plato, prefers aristocracy, yet he does not insist that "might is right." He fears only that the noble spirits of the community might be brought down to the conventional level by the average.<sup>2</sup> Plato's principle of the political administration of the community, or the state, will not be attacked by the modern Marxian theory. Even in the Platonic aristocracy, laws are drawn to protect the interests of the majority of the Proletariat. For him, law is not established by the relative will of the governing or privileged class. His main purpose is to preserve the higher principle of morals; for as Hegel suggests, "the State is the realization of the ethical idea."<sup>3</sup> And laws are useless if the rulers are not good.<sup>4</sup> Every one in the community ought to be above the nature of birds and beasts; that is the fundamental law.<sup>5</sup>

The noblest work of law is to teach men to appreciate the value of justice. It compels the offender "either never at all to do the like again, or never voluntarily, or at any rate in far less degree."<sup>6</sup> It is remarkable that Plato had such a noble idea of law in his day. We should blame ourselves that we have too many state law, and still are repeating immorality, seeking only how we can secretly enjoy injustice. The controversy between the Wets and Drys of today in the United States, and the Five Powers Naval Conference in London, show that human beings still cling to

1 Laws 4.711; 1.630e      2 Gorg. 483d-488a      3 See Hegel's Philosophy of Law. Cf. Laws 4.714a; 12.957d      4 Laws 6.751      5 Ibid. 8.840c-841a  
6 Laws 9.862e





the oldest and less moral tradition, in the name of justice. The naval problem should be solved simply from the ethical standpoint. Which is more evil, to kill men with an eighteen-inch-gun, or a sixteen-inch one? Law must be reinforced by ethical principle.



## IV

God<sup>1</sup> as the measure of all things. God is the highest moral criterion, or personified law of life. Plato says that the temperate man is the friend of God because he is like Him.<sup>2</sup> The good man, being temperate, is able to control himself.<sup>3</sup> Some such element as this is to be found in the nature of the Platonic God. To live a life like this must be the real life of human kind; for it is the permanent law of life. Therefore we shall consider the nature of God, mainly from the angle of ethics, in the following pages.

According to Plato, God loves the middle way. He loves the state of calm without either extreme joy or extreme sorrow, and man who would be like God must have neither excessive pleasure nor pain. This is the life of wisdom or the God-like-life.<sup>4</sup>

Again, God never changes; if God were changed by some external force it must have been by a thing made; if by himself, he would hardly change for worse, because God is good. Therefore he must remain unchangeable, in the most perfect state.<sup>5</sup>

God is perfect righteousness: the righteous man is, then, most like God.<sup>6</sup> He has in him no element of idleness or cowardice.<sup>7</sup> In general,

1. The term is used here in the broader sense; and there is no need that it should be identical with the Christian God. 2 Laws 4.716d 3 Ibid. 1.626-627, 644b; Symp. 212a; Rep. 2.383c etc. 4 Phil. 33b,c; Laws 7.792d 5 Rep. 2.380-1 6 Theaet. 176c 7 Laws 10.901e



God is not the author of evil: He is not the author of all things but only of the Good. God never causes the suffering of man; nor does He make men sinful when He wishes to destroy them. Evil cannot come from God--- a conception strongly emphasized in the Republic and Laws.<sup>1</sup> This, however, is not entirely new with Plato, but rather with Socrates. It is a saying of Socrates that the gods are the givers of all good; and man cannot give them in return anything of good but piety or honor. He attempts to break down the traditional idea of God and the gods, and introduce a fresh idea of God or of religion. "Honor" is the crown of a man who has true knowledge and is perfect.<sup>2</sup>

Plato's God is never approached by sacrifices or material offerings. Here lies a suggestion that the Soul's greatest need is not material satisfaction, but intellectual and ethical eagerness for truth. For Plato, man's ignorance of God is an awful thing.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, the ideal man is not the lover of gain but the lover of wisdom. A man who can join the company of God is happy; "but he who is lifted up with pride, or wealth, or honour, or beauty, is soon deserted by God, and being deserted, he lives in confusion and disorder." Such a man as this seems to become quickly great but may soon be corrupted.<sup>4</sup> Thus Plato teaches us that we ought to be humble, and seek the true knowledge which leads us to the sphere in which God dwells. More like God: this is the end of man in

1 Rep. 2.379,380a; 3.391c; Laws 2.672b      2 Euthyph. 14,15; Laws 7.831;  
12.966      3 Crat. 400e; 425c; Rep. 2.365e      4 Laws 4.716a



his ethical, religious and political relation both in private and community life. God is really our kin. He is the ideal infinity and personality of man. Following after God, we may realize our true life. To live like God--- this is our permanent law of life.





VII The Nature of God, the Clue to  
the Nature of Man

I

Now God ought to be to us the  
measure of all things, and not man,  
as men commonly say: the words are  
far more true of Him.

Laws 4.716c

P l a t o

Plato employs myths to explain the nature of man. They are, however, not simply myths but suggest truths,<sup>1</sup> and are well worth our consideration. In general, Plato deals with man from two different points of view, viz. myth and science. The physical nature of man, including the creation, the soul's pre-existence, future existence and the problem of recollection, is discussed in a mythical manner; the divisions of the soul and corporeal life of man in a scientific manner.

The soul has an intimate relation with life itself in its essence, it is not identical with the world-soul. Yet, the soul is not really an Idea.<sup>2</sup> Plato remarks that the soul is invisible and also is imperishable, but this does not mean that the soul is the same as an Idea, even though it is not destroyed by death, and is the self-moved, ( i.e. the source of

1 Cf. Phaedr. 265d-266a      2 Cf. Siegel remarks that, " Die Ideed sind einfach und unveränderlich. So auch die Seele." Plato u. Sokrates, P.60



motion in everything).<sup>1</sup>

The problems discussed in the foregoing chapters need recapitulation and re-examination some of them from a new angle before we close. There are two different interpretations of the creation of the world in the dialogues, namely, that of the Timaeus and that of the Phaedrus. In the former dialogue, we learn that God made our world in the beginning, and there were as many souls as stars; and every soul was placed in a star; and afterward implanted in bodies. To return to this original state in stars is the highest consolation for the soul.<sup>2</sup> On the contrary, in the Phaedrus, the soul's entering into the body is described in the form of myth as follows: The soul moves itself; or it is the self-moving. The soul is compared to a charioteer and a pair of winged steeds, which are supposed to be grown into one. In the case of the gods, this occasions no trouble, but in the human soul it does. The driver has great difficulty in driving the two steeds--- one of which is noble, and the other ignoble. "When perfect and fully winged " the soul travels upward and he holds the order of the whole world. But in most cases they lose their wings and drop to earth, and " there, finding a home, she ( the soul ) receives an earthly frame which appears to be self-moved, but it is real-

1 In this respect Zeller's argument is more favorable than Ritter's, to modern critics. He points out the various uses of the term "Idea" in the dialogues, and attacks Ritter who insists that the soul signifies an Idea. See further; Zeller, Plato & the Old Academy (1888), P.388 ff ; Cf. Rep. 10.611; Phaedo 78b ff; Phaedr. 245c ff ; Laws 10.893b-894e

2 Tim. 41d ff



ly moved by her ( the soul's ) power; and this composition of soul and body is called a living and mortal creature." <sup>1</sup> Thus Plato distinctly suggests a decline of the soul from its original nature and destination. Except for this difference, the two narratives of the creation of the world are the same in their fundamental conceptions. The ideal home of souls is in an outer region of heaven where the soul of man enjoys the Ideas; where the soul may be nourished by the three intellectual vitamins, viz. the true, the good, and the beautiful.

The myth is produced in the two-fold--- the light of poetry and of metaphysics, in which Plato and other ancient Greek thinkers attempt to discover the truth, or at least, the anticipation of it. The method is open to some fallacies, if we consider it in the light of modern science. The interpretation of the heavenly world is always a reflection of experience on earth. The myths of Plato are products of the transition period of mythology into philosophy and science in the modern sense. The driver , or charioteer may be understood as the reason; the black steed, the sensual element of human nature; the white steed, moral or rational element of human nature. The three divisions of the soul express symbolically certain modern psychological facts.

From the viewpoint of practical life, the myth suggests how it is hard to live a rational life, like God, which is the ideal life of man; or more exactly that the realization of Ideas in practical life is almost

<sup>1</sup> Phaedr. 245c-247



impossible without self-control.

The recognition of a moral and intellectual principle, or law, in human nature, which distinguishes man from the animal, may be said to be one of Plato's great contributions to psychology. From a religious point of view it presents an a priori notion of the fall of man. Plato combines the doctrine of recollection with that of Ideas; and thus reaches the conviction of the immortality of the soul.<sup>1</sup>

In short, as we observed before, according to Plato, human life in the world of phenomena is less significant from the point of view of religion and metaphysics and the arts: it is more significant from that of ethics; for it is good that man should realize the true nature of the soul, or better-self, in practical life. Understood this, we may appreciate the values and meanings of the Platonic conception of man. He never emphasizes the original sin of man, as Christian theologians do, but simply indicates the ignorance of man, which causes all the evils of human society. In this respect, his teaching is nearer to the doctrine of Zen, than to the Christianity of the past. For him, God is the highest moral criterion of man, yet needs less ceremonial worship. Religion would be understood by him to be the contemplation of life, not in temples, or churches, but while walking along the river, or while at one's business.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Chap. V in this writing.





## II

"No one can deny that all things are full of the Divine:" says Plato.<sup>1</sup> This is a popular notion of the Divine among the ancient Greeks. They thought that all life comes from the Divine. And they believed that God is within the human body, as well as in the sun, moon, and stars.<sup>2</sup> In another place, he says that the soul is the most precious possession of man.<sup>3</sup>

In the system of Heraclitus, motion is the cause of growth; and motion is good. Obviously, Plato was familiar with the doctrine and blended it into his system as a "thorough-going sensationalism"<sup>4</sup> through his elaborative metaphysical faculty.

We shall now approach the problem of the Platonic God, mainly from the metaphysical standpoint. Plato's theological argument appears mostly in the Laws; but it is remarkable that there is no reference to the theory of Ideas in relation to the Being of God. We should turn to the Phaedrus, an earlier dialogue, to find the beginning of his philosophical theology.<sup>5</sup> It is, however, not within our present scope to study the problem in detail. Accordingly, we shall consider only his philosophical theology which appears in the later part of the Laws. Here, we find that Plato's treatment of the soul and God, takes no more the form of myth as in the earlier

1 Laws 10.899b

2 Theaet. 151

3 Laws 5.726-727; 10.886c-e

4 Burnet, Gr. Philos., pt. i, P.242

5 Burnet, Platonism (1928), P.113 ff



dialogues, but the form of science. In other words, he is the first who brings the the idea of God into the realm of the science of religion.<sup>1</sup> And he thinks further that the true God can be demonstrated, and belief in Him must be authorized by the social law of the ideal community. He indicates the three main errors of belief in God as follows: (1) atheism ( materialism ), or the denial of the existence of God; (2) Epicureanism, God ( or the gods ) might exist in the world but he is ( they are ) indifferent to human affairs; and (3) religious-commercialism, God's judgment may be escaped by precious offerings.<sup>2</sup> From the moral point of view, he thinks, the third of these is the worst of all.<sup>3</sup>

Pantheism is another word for 'religious-atheism.' Plato does not hold it. He believes in the One, whom we need not identify with either the Christian God nor with the God of the Upanishads. Plato's God is to be considered not as an Idea, but as a Soul---immortal and imperishable. His God depends upon Himself alone, without any other activities. Since the motions of the soul are thoughts, memories, wishes, fears, and the like,<sup>4</sup> it may be correct to think that the creation of the world by the Platonic God does not signify the physical creation but the mental one. Accordingly, his idea of the Divine cannot be polytheistic, as it commonly appears in Greek literature.

1 Cf. Burnet, Gr. Philos. i, P. 336 ff. 2 E.g. a similar idea of the Indulgence of the Medieval church. Cf. Burnet, Platonism, P. 116; Taylor, Plato, P. 490 3 Laws 10.889 f 4 Burnet, Platonism, P. 117



## III

We have discussed briefly the nature of the soul and of the Idea in the preceeding sections. But there remains still a fundamental problem--- one of the most difficult, and an unsettled problem since Zeller pointed<sup>1</sup> out. The question is whether the Ideas are " thoughts or creations " of God, or " immanent determinations " of God's essence? <sup>1</sup> Toward solving this problem, it may be enough if we attain a clear distinction between two words, viz. 'God' and ' the Good' , or the 'Idea of Good'. <sup>2</sup> At the outset of the discussion, we turn to the argument by Zeller. According to him, the Good, or the highest Idea, mentioned by Plato in the Republic, is " the source of Being and of Science, of Truth and of Knowledge: and as the sun is higher than light and the eye, so is the Good higher than Being and Science." <sup>3</sup> The Divine Reason, described in the Philebus, is , he proceeds to point out, no more nor less than the Good. Yet the description of the Creator of the Timaeus gives us an inconsistent notion that God's being is separated from the Ideas from which God has copied the universe. <sup>4</sup> Zeller abandons the latter notion in order to favor his hypothesis that the Platonic doctrine of

1 His Plato & the Old Academy, P. 223 ff      2 We need not here distinguish the different conceptions of the two terms in detail. Cf. The "good" (= essential or true beauty; or *αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν*) of the Symposium 211e; the "Idea of good" or (*εἶδος τῶραθοῦ*) of the Republic 6.505d . See further Taylor, Plato, Pp. 231,232; 285-289; 441,442: Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, iii, P. 85,86      3 Zeller, P.O.A., P.279 f Cf. Rep. 6.508e      4 Tim. 34



Ideas must have an inter-connection as a whole.<sup>1</sup> He also affirms that "the Ideas are neither the thoughts of man nor of God."<sup>2</sup> From this standpoint he argues that "neither a thought nor an attribute, nor a creature of God, could be called by Plato an Idea; since no thought is possible except through an intuition of the Idea; no creation except by the imitation of the Idea; no quality or attribute except through participation in the Idea." Thus, his interpretation of the theory of Ideas is strictly logical, no less so than that of Plato in his arguments. Again, supposing "God to be a product of Ideas; an individual that participates in the Idea of the Good? In that case He would not be the Absolute Eternal God, but only one of the 'created gods.' He would stand to Ideas in the same relation that the spirits of the stars and the souls of men stand to them."<sup>3</sup> Thirdly, he introduces the hypothesis of Herman; viz. God is a special principle which exists independently of, though side by side with, the Ideas. And "He neither brought them forth, nor was brought forth by them," and we might suppose that "His activity essentially consists in working out the combination of Ideas with Phenomena--- in forming the world according to Ideas."<sup>4</sup> Zeller rejects this hypothesis, for it can hardly be ascribed to Plato.

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1 Zeller, Plato and the Older Academy, P. 283      2 Ibid. P.248; This is a very true conception so far as the theory of Ideas is concerned, I think.

3 Ibid. P.284; It is rather noticeable that Zeller renders the word 'spirit' as the 'soul' in the case of the stars. Probably he does not recognize the identity of the soul of man and of stars, in its essential

nature.      4 Ibid.





Upon these considerations, Zeller finally concludes that the unity of the Platonic system may be established only upon the ground that the efficient is never separated from the logical cause, God from the highest Idea or the Good. The highest Idea must be identical with God, the Platonic God is, therefore, an Idea.<sup>1</sup>

Zeller does not, however, deny the fact that Plato often mentions God as a person. To solve this problem he supposes that the representation is indispensable because of showing that (1) the immortality of Ideas must be explained together with phenomena (2) in order to represent the perfection of God, e.g. God's care of men; and (3) that Plato does not deliberately translate "philosophic Ideas into a language grown strange to him, but rather that he himself shares the religious belief, and holds it, in the main to be well founded."<sup>2</sup> Thus, Zeller obviously confuses the nature of the soul, with that of the Idea. He must have the same conviction as the Neo-Platonists of God as the highest Being, i.e. the Good, Reason; in other words, "the creative principle, revealing itself in the phenomenon: because God is good, He formed the world."<sup>3</sup> Thus interpreted, Zeller attempts to prove that Plato's theory of Ideas has no inconsistency with his cosmology.<sup>4</sup>

1 Zeller, Plato and the Older Academy, P. 285 f 2 Ibid. P. 289; Cf. Tim. 29

3 Zeller, E.O.A., P. 292



## IV

Zeller's argument, which suggests that God is identical with the highest Idea, or the Idea of the Good, has been accepted by many scholars, though there is a certain ambiguity in his affirmation, as we have observed. Against this school J. Burnet appears with some British scholars, who approach the problem, mainly, from the religious point of view, while Zeller and his followers regard it from the metaphysical standpoint. Naturally German scholars have been contending with British scholars.<sup>1</sup> We cannot say which is more in the right without understanding the different standpoints of all of them; for Plato himself gives no distinct solution of the problem. It is, however, not useless to mention a further argument maintained by Burnet, and generally favored by recent students of the philosophy of Plato.

Plato believes, as we have already seen, in the Only God.<sup>2</sup> Burnet apprehends the Platonic God as a soul; He is not an Idea. Moreover, He is not merely a soul but "a perfectly good soul" or the ἀρίστη ψυχή.<sup>3</sup>

1 Cf. Their controversies on the problem of the order of the dialogues. See the table of the order of the dialogues in the Appendix. 2 Or creator, maker and the like; viz. the δημιουργός. Cf. Tim. 29e, 41b. The θεός or θεοί are created by the will of God. Burnet remarks as follows: "The Ionians had called fire, air, water and the like gods, but that only meant there were no other gods but these. Anaximander and Xenophanes had called the worlds or the World gods or God, but that was at most a sort of pantheism, as it was also with Parmenides." Gr. Philos., i, P. 336

3 Laws 10.898



Again, He is certainly "a personal God," for he is the Mind or Reason (*νοῦς*) which exists in a living soul. Plato thinks that the motions of the heavenly bodies are strictly regular; and they are caused by a good soul or souls. And for him this is God.

Is God identical with the Good? If not, we must make clear the relation between God and the Good. The modern theist's conception of God may be identical with the Platonic conception of the Good, "though it by no means exhausts" it. On the contrary, the Good is not to be identified with the Platonic God; for the Good is not a soul but an Idea.<sup>1</sup> In short, the Platonic God is not an Idea but a soul; and He is "the self-moved mover of the best motions."<sup>2</sup> The Good is not a soul, but it is "independent of God, and even above Him, since it is the pattern by which He fashions the world."<sup>3</sup> Thus, the Platonic God is a self-moved mover, but necessarily the best of all. Under these circumstances we may assume that "human souls, though inferior, exist just as truly as the divine soul."<sup>4</sup>

From Burnet's argument mentioned above, we may affirm further that the nature of God is very much like that of man, and that man has the possibility of becoming like God.<sup>5</sup>

In this sense the highest moral criterion of Plato is to live (1) an ideal life in which the living principle of the Idea is the Good;

1 Burnet, Gr. Philos. i, P. 336      2 Cf. Phaedr. 245e      3 Burnet, Gr. Philos. i, P. 337      4 Ibid. 338      5 Cf. Laws 10.899e; Rep. 6.501b; Gorg. 507e; Symp. 212; Theaet. 176b; Phil. 39e; Phaedo 79 ff



i.e. the realization of the Ideas in human life; (2) the creative life from which all reality proceeds; i.e. the experience of God in human life.<sup>1</sup>

The right measure of man is God. And to know God is to rightly evaluate our life, both in the realm of phenomena and that of Ideas. It is the life of Unity.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. R.C. Lodge, Plato's Theory of Ethics, P.173; Abelt, Platonische Aufsätze, P.110; „Sieht man also in der Verähnlichung mit Gott das Prinzip der Ethik, so würde hiernach das reine Denken, das reine Suchen nach Wahrheit die eigentliche und einzige Bedingung sittlicher Vollkommenheit sein.“





A P P E N D I X



## A d d i t i o n a l   N o t e s :

## Page

- vi L. Campbel devided the whole dialogues into nine groups:-
1. Laches, Carmides, Lysis.
  2. Protagoras, Ion, Meno.
  3. Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo.
  4. Symposium, Phaedrus, Cratylus.
  5. Gorgias, Republic.
  6. Euthydemus, Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophistes, Statesman, Philebus
  7. Timaeus, Critias.
  8. Laws
  9. Doubtful and spurious works:- The Lesser Hippias, First Alcibias and Menexenus; Hippias and Clitophon, etc.

For further see EB<sup>9</sup>, art. " Plato " by Campbell.

- 64 n.1 Plato compares νόμοι to music, or rather, harmonious strains.  
Cf. Laws 7.800; 3.700a,b

- 66 n.4 4.718e



## DIFFERENT VIEWS CONCERNING THE ORDER OF THE DIALOGUES

	Tenne- mann 1792-95	Schleier- macher 1804-28	Ribbing <sup>2</sup> 1858	Socher 1820	Stall- baum 1827-60
1. Laches	1	3	4	2	1
2. Charmides	2	4 <sup>1</sup>	3		1 <sup>1</sup>
3. Protagoras	4	2	2	9	5
4. Euthyphro	6	5	5	4	4
5. Apologia	7	7	6	5	6
6. Kriton	8	8	7	6	7
7. Gorgias	11	9	8	11	8
8. Menon	10	11	10	2	3
9. Euthydem	3	12	11	8	9
10. Kratylos	5	13	12	3	10
11. Symposion	17	16	16	14	16
12. Phaidon	9	17	17	7	17
13. Politeia I	Pol. I-X 19-23	Pol. I-X 19-23	Pol. I-X 19-23	Pol. I-X 15-19	Pol. I-X 19-23
14. --- II-IV					
15. --- V-VII					
16. --- VIII-IX					
17. ----- X					
18. Phaidoros	18	1	1	13	15
19. Theaitetos	12	10	9	10	11
20. Parmenides	16	6	15		14
21. Sophistes	13	14	13		12
22. Politikos	14	15	14		13
23. Philebos	15	18	18	12	18
24. Timaios (next. Kritias)	24b 24a	24	24	20	24
25. Nomoi	25	25	(25)	21	25

The present chart is rearranged from Ritter's charts in his Platon, Zweiter Teil, S. 230, 231 and 254, 255, with some alternations and additions.



	Hermann 1839	Stein- hart 1850-66	Munk 1856	Suse- mihl 1855-60	Zeller 1883	Reich- müller 1881-84
1	2	2	4	2	4	1
2	1	1	3	1	5	2
3	3(4?)	3	2	3	6	3
4	8(9?)	6	21	8	1	14
5	5(6?)	7	22	5	2	15
6	6(7?)	8	23	6	3	19(?) <sup>7</sup>
7	7(8?)	9	5	7	8	18(?) <sup>7</sup>
8	9(10?)	5	17	4 <sup>4</sup>	7	13
9	4(5?)	4	7	9	10	6
10	10(11?)	10	6	10	12	17(16?) <sup>7</sup>
11	16(=19?)	16	8	16	16	10
12	17(=21?)	17	24	17	17	11
13	19(= 3) <sup>3</sup>	Po l. 1	Po l. 1	Po l. 1		4
14	20(=14) <sup>3</sup>	X	X	X		5
15	22(=20) <sup>3</sup>	X	X	X		7
16	21(=15) <sup>3</sup>	19-23	11-15	19-23		8
17	23 (?)					9
18	15(=18?)	15	9	12	9 <sup>5</sup>	16(17?) <sup>7</sup>
19	11( 12?)	11	18	11	11	12
20	14(=17?)	12	1	15	15	22
21	12( 13?)	13	19	13	13 } <sup>6</sup>	23
22	13(=16?)	14	20	14	14 }	24
23	18(=22?)	18	10	18	18	21
24	24	24	16	24	24	20(?) <sup>7</sup>
25	25	25	25	25	25	25





	Peipers 1883	Pfleiderer 1896	Horn 1893-1904	Immisch 1899	Windelband 1905
1	1?	1	8	11	1
2	2?	2	4	13	2
3	4?	3	9	2	6(=8)
4	3?	9	II	6	3
5	5?	7	III	4	4
6	6?	8	1	5	5
7	7	10	10	3 <sup>12</sup>	7(=8)
8	8	11	7	7 <sup>13</sup>	9
9	17) (etwa	17	5	12	10
10	18)=14 u.15	15	11	8	11
11	11	22	16	15 <sup>14</sup>	14(=15)
12	9	21	22	16	21(=24)
13	12	4	Po. I-X	9	8(=6 f)
14	13	5 [II-V, 471c] <sup>10</sup>	Po. I-X	14 [II-V, 16 ohne IV]	15(=13f)
15	14) (etwa	20 [V Schließ VI, VII.]	Po. I-X	10 [V, 18-VII]	24(=13f)
16	15)=17 u.18	6	17-21	17	16
17	16	13 <sup>11</sup>	17-21	18	17
18	10 <sup>8</sup>	12	6	1	13(=15)
19	20(19?)	14	13	19	12
20	21	19	12	20	XX
21	22	16	14	22	XVIII
22	23	18	15	23	XIX
23	24	24	[XXIII]	21	22(=24)
24	19 <sup>9</sup> (20?)	23	24	24	23(=24)
25	(25)	25	25	25	25



	Ritter 1888	Lutos- lawski 1897	Gomperz 1902	Natorp 1903	Räder 1903	Ritter 1907
1	1	5	2	4	2	1
2	2	4(?)	3	5	3	2
3	3	6	4	3	5	3
4	8	1(?)	6	7(6)	7	4
5	6	2(?)	1(?)	1(2)	1	5
6	7	3(?)	12(?)	2(1)	4	6
7	9	9	5	8	6	7
8	10	7	7	6(7)	8	8
9	4	8	11(?)	11	9	9
10	5	10	18	12	10	10
11	12	11	8	14	11	11
12	11	12	10	13	12	12
13	Pol. I-X 13-17	Pol. I-X 13-17	Pol. I-X 13-17	Pol. I-X 13-17	Pol. I-X 13-17	Pol. I-X 13-17
14						
15						
16						
17						
18	18(19?) <sup>16</sup>	18 <sup>18</sup>	Ein seiner früheren Gestalt <sup>9</sup> *	9	18	18
19	19(18?) <sup>17</sup>	19 <sup>19</sup>	20	10	19	19
20	(20)?	20	19	20	20	20
21	21	21	21	21	21	21
22	22	22	22	22	22	22
23	23	23	23	23	23	23
24	24	24	24	24	24	24
25	25	25	25	25	25	25

\* in his former figure.



	Campbel 1867	Jowett 1891	Taylor 1927-29
1	1	2	2
2	2	1	1
3	3	3	7
4	5	9	8
5	6	10	9
6	7	11	10
7	12	13	5
8	4	8	6
9	18	4	4
10	11	5	3
11	9	7	12
12	8	12	11
13	Pol. I-X 14-18	Pol. I-X 14-18	Pol. I-X 14-18
18	16	6	13
19	20	21	20
20	19	20	19
21	21	22	21
22	22	23	22
23	23	24	23
24	24	19	24
25	25	25	25

- 1 Shortly before 30
- 2 Ribbing closely follows Schleiermacher.
- 3 No exact dates of the main parts of the dialogue are given by Hermann.
- 4 until 399
- 5 probably 394
- 6 immediate before or after the first Sicilian journey of Plato
- 7 Ritter's marks of interrogation because of uncertainty of Lit. Fehld. I, 297 & II, 83
- 8 partly includes the Phaedo
- 9 include the Rep.
- 10 or 473d,e
- 11 The whole work of the Rep. may be placed between 22 and 23
- 12 pledge 399
- 13 about 384
- 14 long time before 384
- 15 closed in the year 80, and began 70
- 16 early 375
- 17 about 370
- 18 probably between 380 and 378
- 19 probably before 366





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Berkeley, Calif.  
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